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The " Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International \'Jatercourses " 1 and that of "International Liability 
for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited 
by International Law " 2 are two topics currently before the 
International Law Commission . The aim of both topics is 
ultimately the codification of the law covering their respective 
areas. Both topics are dynamic in nature. They aim to 
make a positive contribution towards the progressive develop-
ment of international law and its codification. Indeed 
these were t-he reasons why the topics were chosen by the 
International Law Cofilmission . The topics seek to provide 
umbrella provisions and to serve as framework instruments 
for States to conclude their particular agreements . The 
Special Rapporteur of the International Watercourses topic, 
Mr . S . M. Schwebel, viewed the predominant use of the product: 
of his topic thus :3 
[ It ] ... should serve to provide, except for 
navigational uses, the general principles and 
rules governing international watercourses absent 
agreement among the States concerned and to 
provide guidelines for the negotiation of future 
specific agreements . 
. .. the Commission ' s articles would contain general 
principles plus resicual rules applicable to subject 
matters not covered by such agreements . 4 
These observations , with relevant adjustments , it is submitted, 
may be applicable to the topic on international liability, 
of the Special Rapporteur , Mr . R. Q. Quentin-Baxter. Thus , 
i t is true that general principles , rules and guidelines are 
being formulated to govern the two regimes established u~der. 
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Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s topic (regimes of prevention and reparation 
where loss or lnJury is prospective; regime of reparation 
where loss or injury is actual) . Further these principles, 
rules or guidelines may serve for the negotiation of future 
specific agreements and would serve as a statement of what 
the law is , if no agreement exists among States .5 However, 
States are free to conclude spec~fic agreements adjusting the 
rules to their unique situations. 6 
The writer sees a funda~ental distinction between 
the content of the umbrella provisions the topics seek to 
provide . The topic of international liability provides 
the umbrellq- __ provisions, the fra1J1ework instrument that specific 
topics such as that of the international watercourses topic 
should consult when drawing up their particular provisions . 
Indeed the content of the topic on international liability 
is not restricted to any particular subject area . The 
international liability topic like the topic of State Respon-
sibility is concerned with the wider policy question of the 
development of international law as a whole . What it sets 
down to do is to draw from current expressior1 in international 
law, the pattern of the evolution of the interrelationshj p 
of States . Thus , the topic is primarily an expression 
of current international legal policy considerations in 
general . To give this policy effect certain all 2mbracing 
' umbrella ' rules will be formed . These in turn will te 
applicable when umbrella rules and guidelines affecting 
specific areas of international law are formulated . The 
latter will in tur~ be applicable when specific agreements 
are concluded bet~een States . The interrelationship of 
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the topics and their status , vis-a - vis each other and pro-
gressive developments in international law in general, might 
be expressed in a diagram . 
New Trends in International 
Relations between States 
Progressive Development 
of International Law 
T Reflected in general policy behind 
I umbrella provisions , e . g . International 
Liabil ity for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out of Acts not Prohibited 
-. - by International Law 
!Specific Areas of International 
1 
Law, e . g . Non Navigational Us es 
of In·ternationa~ Watercours e s 
Thus , it is submitted there is a direct relationship 
between the topics . 
The writer now proposes to outline what her paper 
hope s to accompJish. The paper is primarily concerned , 
as its title suggests , with a critical and analytic approach 
to the underlying phi losophy of the law on the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses . This study is approached 
and conducted taking account of contemporary development 
of the international liability for injurious consequences 
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law 
top ic. Thus, the point of inquiry, the critical analysis , 
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is coloured by the international liability topic . The 
study interrelates the two topics and by a comparative assess -
ment of how the one is seen from the rules established by 
the other an evaluation of the underlying philosophy of 
the first is established. 
The result of this enquiry the writer hopes will help 
advance in some way the understanding of both topics . 
It is proposed to take up what Mr . Quentin - Baxter 
7 said in his recent report . 
Moreover, while the topic of Non-Navigable Watercourses 
awaits the attention of a new Special Rapporteur , 
his work can be made a l ittle easier by 
continued exploration of issues that are germane 
to ev:ery situation in which actions taken in 
one country produce effects in another . 
The paper proposes 1n an ancillary way to use the 
international watercourse topic as an example of how the 
principles and rules formulated by Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s topic 
can be given practical effect . 
The paper is divided in the following manner : 
( 1 ) Chapter I - Part A. " Scope of the Topics " 
Part B. "The Duty to Negotiate" 
( 2 ) Chapter II - The Concept of Equitable Participation 
( 3 ) Chapter III - The Concept of Appreciable Harm 
(4) Conclusion . 
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CHAPTER I 
PART A. " SCOPE " OF THE TOPICS 
I ntroduction 
The enquiry in Part A of t h is chapter is based on 
t h e pr el i minary question of discover i ng the " scope " of the 
top i cs . The writer sees two aspects to the question of scope . 
The first and the less important of the two is the aspect 
of content . Here , it i s clear that the topic on non - naviga -
tional uses of international watercour·ses deals with a parti -
cular area whereas the in j urious consequences arising out 
o f acts not prohibited by international law topic is one 
of generality and pertains to not one particular area exclusively . 
The second is the enquiry whether the principles established 
by both topics are that much different . To answer this 
means not just considering the article on ·scope but taking 
in to account t h e oth er articles where relevant . 
The concept of a " shared resource" will also be examined 
in the same light . Here , another question to consider is 
what the value of the concept is and how it affects a system 
State . 
Scope of each topic , a critical look 
The Non - Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
The scope of the articles on the Law of the 
Non - havigational Uses of International \-:atercourses 
i s set out in draft article 1 . 
1. The present articles apply to uses of international 
watercourse systems and of their waters for 
purposes other than navigation and to measures 
of conservation related to the uses of those 
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watercourse systems and their waters . 
2. The use of the waters of international watercourse 
systems for naviga~ion is not within the scope 
of the present articles except in so far as other 
uses of the waters af~ect or are affected by 
navigation . 
Thu s , from draft article 1(1) it appears that the articles 
will apply to every use of an international watercourse 
system, and its waters, except navigational, and to 
conservation measures that are connected to such uses . 
Although navigational uses of international watercourse 
systems and waters are expressly excluded in article 1(1) 
in article 1(2) i t is submitted that navigational uses 
of waters of an international watercourse system can 
b e brought within the articles. This occurs in the 
situation where other uses of the waters are affected 
by navigation or when naviga·lion 9-ffects_ the other uses 
of the waters. In such situations the ·regime set up 
by the articles will come into existence . This would 
bring navigational uses to the extent qualified within 
the scope of this topic. Can this conclusion be right 
wh en the topic is meant to deal solely with the nan -
navigational uses of international watercourses? 8 
The Special Rapporteur at the conclusion of his 
report gave special consideration to this query . He 
makes it clear that although the topic was on the law 
of the non-navigatio~al uses of international watercourses , 
there was no doubt that there was an interrelationship 
between navigational uses and other uses . 9 
Regarding article 1 ( 2) the Commission commented 
that it 
1 
recognizes that the exclusion of navigational uses 
cannot be complete . As both the replies of States 
to the Commiss i on ' s questionnaire and the facts 
of the uses of water indicate , the impact of 
navigation on other uses of water and that of 
ot her uses on navigation must be addressed in 
the present articles .. . · [ The provision ] has 
been negatively cast , however, to emphasize that 
nav i gational uses are not with i n the scope of 
t he present articles except in so far as other 
uses of waters affect navigation or are affected 
by n av i gation . 1 0 
Th e Commission came to the conclusion that 11 
. . . i t must deal with the frequent and significant 
interactions between navigational uses and 
o t her uses 
and t hat th is fact was "understood and generally accepted ". 1 2 
The question that remains unanswered in the articles 
i s t h e crucial one of what exactly i s meant by the term 
"interna t ional wate r course system" . Recourse is found by 
looking at the "Note " 1 3 put forward by the Corn.mission . 
Th e Note defines a watercourse system and an international 
wa t ercourse system and it i s worth quoting . 1 ~ 
A watercourse system is formed of hydrographic components 
such as rivers , lakes , canals, glaciers and g:::'oundwater 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship 
a unitary whole ; thus , any use affecting waters 
i n one part of the system may affect wate:t'S 
in another part . 
An ' international watercourse system ' is a watercourse 
system , components of which are situated in two or 
more States . 
To the extent t hat parts of tl~e waters in the cne 
State are not affected by or do not affect * uses 
of waters in another State , they shall not be 
t reated as being included in the international 
watercourse system . Thus , to the extent that 
11 my emphas i s 
the uses of the waters of the system 
have an effect on one anothe r, to 
that extent the system is international , 
but only to that extent ; accordingly, 
there is not an absolute, but a 
relative , international charac ter of 
the watercourse. 
It is submitted that the key word to what 
is meant by an international watercourse system 
is the word " affect ". If a State makes uses 
of its waters which do not affect the uses of the 
waters of another State , then the States do not 
qualify as being included in the international 
watercourse system . 
In ~onclusion , it is submitted that for the 
articles to apply , an international watercourse 
system must exist and this only arises if and 
when the use of the waters in one State affects 
the use of the waters in another State. 
However, as this definitional clause is not 
i ncluded in the draft articles it is import a nt 
to turn to the articles and dis c over just when they 
do apply . 
The enquiry here will begin with the concept 
of use. From article 1 ( 1 ) it is noted that the 
use of waters is a prerequisite for the application 
of the articles . What then is use? Use as 
understood by article 1 ( 1 ) excludes the using of 
waters for navigational purposes and includes 
measures of conservation , 
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To carry on this examination of the concept of 'use ' . 
and thus be able to define the scope of the topic 
articles 2 to 4 will be examin e d . 
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Article 2 defines a system State and is self -
explanatory : 
For the purposes of the present articles , a State 
in whose territory part of the waters of an international 
watercourse system exists is a system State . 
Thus, relating this article to article 1(1) it is submitted 
that the only time the regime set up by the articles applies 
to system States is when a use is made. 
Does this mean that the articles apply to all system 
States the moment a use has been made of an international 
watercourse system, of which they are a system State? 
It i s submitted that the answer to this is no. Support 
for this submission is found in articles 3 1 ~ and 4 16 • 
The point to note about article 3 is that where 
certain system States wish to enter into a systems agreement, 
if that agreement provides for the use of the waters of an 
international watercourse system , the use of which is going 
to " an appreciable extent " affect advers2ly another or 
other non-participating system State/States , that system 
agreement may not be entered into . The article should further 
be read in conjunction with article 4(2). 
Article 4(2) deals with the situation where certain 
system States may be in the process of negotiating or parti-
cipating in a system agreement that only applies to a part 
of the international watercourse system . If the use is 
going to affect to an 11 appr~ciable extent " the u se of the 
waters of a n international watercourse system of a non-
participating system State , the n6n-participating system 
State is ' entitled t o participate in the agreement '. 
The use is here qualified and is further defined by a reference 
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back to article 3 . It is submitted that the use must be 
one that to " an appreciable extent" affects "adversely 11 
the non-participating system State . 
The conclusion arrived at is that the draft articles 
apply in two particular situations . The first is where 
a system agreement is being negotiated by system States . 
If the whole international watercourse system is being 
looked at, then all the system States are entitled to parti -
c i pate in the negotiations and become party to any system 
agreement that might be concluded . If certain system States 
are negotiating a system agreement over part of the inter-
national wa~~_rcourse system then the second situation of 
when the draft articles apply comes into existence : this 
i s when use of the waters of a non - participating·system State 
would be to an appreciable extent affected adversely . 
However , the concept of what uses will make the present 
articles applicable is not complete without an examination 
of article 5 . Article 5 defines when the use of waters 
of an international watercourse system constitutes a shared 
natural resource : 
1 . To the extent that the use of waters of an 
i nternational watercourse system in the territory 
of one system State affects the use of waters 
of that system in the territory of another 
system State , the waters are , for the 
purposes of the present articles , a shared 
natural resource . 
2 . Waters of an international watercourse system 
which constitute a shared natural resGurce shall 
be used by a system State in accordance with 
the present articles . 
An observation of a general chara6ter may be made of this 
article . The concept of a ' shared natural resource ' he~e 
refers to a resource that is within the territorial jurisdiction 
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of a State; it is not a resource such as the high seas, 
where the resource may be viewed as being a shared resource 
to all nations and being part of the common heritage of mankind. 
Thus, the concept here is different because the resource 
exists within the territorial jurisdiction or control of 
• 1 7 a sovereign. How does it become a shared natural resource? 
It so becomes when a use of waters of one system State 
affects the use of waters in the territory of another system 
State . Thus, if the use does not affect the use of the waters 
in another system State , then the international watercourse 
system is not a shared natural resource . It is submitted 
that full ci_rcle is arrived at with this definition . This 
is because in the Commission ' s Note an international water-
course system was regarded as a creature that only came 
into existence if and when or to the extent that the use 
of the waters of a watercourse system affected the use of 
the waters in another system State . Thus, it was relative 
whether or not a watercourse system qualified as being 
international. 
In the draft articles 1 to 4 it was observed that 
· the articles only applied in two circwnstance s . 
In article 5 full circle is arrived at because it 
takes one back to the initial point of enquiry - whether 
use of the waters by a system State affects the use of 
waters in another system State . If the ans~er is in the 
affirmative , a shared natural resource exists and the articles 
apply . 
here . 
This leads to the enqui~y as to what "affects " means 
If one turns to the observations of use one notes 
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that the term affect is qualified by ' adversely ' and quantified 
by ' appreciably '. Thus , it might be concluded that unless 
there is an adverse effect of an appreciable extent , use 
is not affected . 
It is tentatively submitted,that perhaps the under-
lying philosophy as to when a shared natural resource,or 
indeed, when the articles spring into existence,is when use 
of waters in an international watercourse system by one or more 
system State or States affects adversely and to an appreciable 
extent the use of waters of another or other system State/s . 
How does one reconcile this view with the observation 
that all sys1em States have a right to participate in a 
systems agre~ment which applies to the whole international 
watercourse system? It is submitted that this paragraph 
of article 4 entitles a system State to participate . 
would this entitlement be used? This question will be 
considered in the concluding paragraph. 
It is now proposed to turn to the consideration of 
the scope of the liability for injurious consequences of 
acts not prohibited by international law topic . 
International Liability For Injurious consequences Of A-:::ts 
Not Prohibited By Jnternat ion al Law 
In Sect ion 1 ( l) of the ~chematic outline8 the scope of 
the topic is outlined : 
Activities within the territory or control of a 
State whi ch give rise or may give rise to loss or 
injury to persons or things . within the territory 
or control of another State . 
Section 1(2) defines the term& 19 As the title of the topic 
suggests , what one is here concerned with is ' injurious 
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consequences ' which are caused by acts that are not prohibited 
by international law . 
The Special Rapporteur defined the scope of his 
• ? 0 topic as such : · 
In principle though this is not always literally 
true, a transboundary element is an essential 
ingredient in the present topic : typically, 
the topic deals with activities in one 
country which produce adverse consequences 
in another country . * 
It is noted that the topic deals with and establishes two 
different criteria,as to when the rules it establishes are 
applicable . These are the regimes of prevention and reparation 
when loss o~ injury is prospective and reparation when loss 
or inJury is actual . 
Thus , the Special Rapporteur explained : ' 1 · 
I n relation to the establishment of regimes of prevention 
and reparation all loss or injury is prospective: 
in relation to the establishment of an obligation 
to provide reparation, all loss or injury is actual . 
The primary aim of the topic is to encourage States 
to establish regimes of prevention; the secondary consideration 
is to provide a regime of reparation when injurious consequences 
have occurred and there is no regime in existence governing 
the situations . 22 
Vital to understanding the scope of the topic are 
two fundamental points . The first is that the topic is 
built on the principle as expressed by S~ction 5 ( 1 ): 
The aim and purpose of the present articles is to 
ensure to acting States as much freedom of choice , 
in relation to activities within their territory 
or control , as is compatible with adequate 
protection for the interests of affected States . 
The other ' cardinal ' po{nt is that the topic is not 
concerned with rules of prohibition . 23 Thus , in his 
i':my emphasis 
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preliminary report the Special Rapporteur stated: 24 
The primary aim of the draft articles must therefore 
be to promote the constructions of regimes to 
regulate , without recourse to prohibition 
Thus,one is not dealing with the question of whether 
a particular act or activity is wrongful ; neither is the 
scope of the topic confined to lawful acts . 25 Thu s , i n 
terms of definition the topic is not like the regime estab-
lish ed by State Responsibility which arises only when a 
wrongful act h as been committed . 26 The present topic is 
independent of t h e topic of State Responsibility and may 
even i n appropriate cases be substituted for it . 27 The division 
of the topic~ was clear right from their starting points . 
Th us , the Special Rapporteur for State Responsibility ( Part I ), 
Mr . Ago , felt that in establishing the boundaries of his own 
topic which was to deal only with the consequences of inter -
n ationally wrongfu l acts , there was scope for the develop -
ment of a separate regime dealing with liability for injurious 
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international 
law. 2 8 
The Special Rapporteur , Mr . Quent in --Baxter , aligned 
h is topic wi t h that of State Responsibility in terms of 
defin i tion in this manner : 29 
State responsibility is engaged only when a wrongful 
act h as been committed . The present topic is by 
definition concerned only with a situation where 
the conduct of the State having territorial or 
oth er controlling jurisdiction has not been shown 
to be wrongful . 
In h is prelimi nary report the Special Rapporteur said : 30 
... t h ere can be no onus upon an injured State to 
pr ov e t h e lawfuln~ss of the activities of which it 
complains , the phrase carries implicitly the enlarged 
meani n g ' acts , whether or not prohibited '. 
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The point is one is not concerned in determining whether 
or not 
... a particular territorial use, involving the 
risk of loss or injury was unlawful and therefore 
prohibited . 3 1 
In the same manner one is not looking into the question 
of the wrongfulness or non- wrongfulness of the particular 
act or activity that might cause or that has caused loss 
or injury to another State . This would again be in the 
domain of State Responsibility for wrongfulness . 
What one is here concerned with is to consider the 
problem with a view to accommodating the various interests 
without going into the question of lawfulness or wrongfulness . 
Inherent in the topic is the concept of the "balance of 
interest " test . Articles 6 and 7 are relevant here as 
well as the principle embodied in article 5(1).Although 
this concept will be looked at in greater detail subsequently, 
mention has to be made of it . The importance of the balance 
of interest test is that even under the ·regimes set up under 
this topi~ a State may not be liable for any loss or inJury 
that the affected State may suffer or has suffered . 
the Special Rapporteur said: 32 
.. . the underlying purpose of this topic is not 
merely to requite or even to avoid, los s e s and 
injuries: it is to enable States to harmonize 
their aims and activities, so that the 
benefit one State chooses to pursue does 
not entail the loss or injury another· 
has to suffer . Every kind of factor· 
may enter into the equation . 
A result of the balance of. interest test, it is 
submitted , is that States may ·be under no liability to 
Thus, 
stop the proposed activity or pay reparation for loss or 
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injury caused . 
There is a point in relation to State Responsibility 
that has to be commented on, 
The present topic, though 
separate from that of the topic on State Responsibility for 
wrongful acts , is not mutually exclusive at all levels . 
The fact is that there does exist a point of intersection 
between harm and wrong . 
Thus, at the junction where h arm 
becomes wrongful then the rules of State Responsibility for 
wrongfulness take over . 
stated : :i 3 
However , as the Special Rapporteur 
this melancholy end - result does not represent 
th e main thrust or focus of the topic , which 
i s concerned with minimizing the risk of loss 
or ihjury , and of making appropriate advance 
provision for such risks as cannot reasonably be 
avoided . 
Finally the question of scope in terms of the actual 
content that the topic covers has not been fully resolved . 5 ~ 
Th e topic is stated in the most general terms and thus may 
cover any given situation . 
However , tc the extent that the 
Special Rapporteur relies largely on materials in the area 
of t h e use of the physical environment, it might be concluded 
t hat this is an area in which the topic will bear influence . 
By so concluding , this by no way restricts the boundaries 
of t h e topic . 
Thus , the area encompassed within the topic 
can certainly include activities which may c~use economic 
l oss or in j ury in another State , whether by use of the 
physical environment or not . 
Conclusion - ·----
It i s interesting to note some of the· comments on 
the Comm i ssion ' s work registered in the General Assembly 
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on the law of non- navigational uses of international water-
courses . The delegation from Egypt,for example,stated 
that the method adopted by the Commission 35 
be based on the principle of goodwill , the positive 
use of law, humanitarian concerns, co-operation among 
the user States of watercourses and their responsibilities 
in the context of fundamental rules , 
The representative from Argentina stated that : 36 
... the international community ' had become aware 
that the world ' s resources were limited and that 
countries sharing natural resources such as water 
should seek to ensure their equitable and rational 
use'. 
Finally this comment was made : 3 7 
Moreover , it was stressed that a balance must be 
rnain_i,:.ained between the requirements of sovereignty 
·and the requirements of good neighbourliness 
and ~he prohibition of abuses . 
These comments can find parallels in the topic of 
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited 
by international law . Thus , in his preliminary report the 
S . R . 3s pecial apporteur said : 
The theme of accountability for acts not prohibited 
comes into prominence precisely because there 
i s need for a new and imaginative effort to 
reconcile the widest possible freedom of action 
with respect for the rights of others, and 
with a justified appreh ens ion that mankind 
may perish through undisciplined use of industrial 
and technological power . 
Inherent in both topics, it is submitted, is the under-
lying theme that States are interdependent , thus the establish-
ment of rules that will foster co - operation and co-ordination 
of activities that cause a minimum amount of · loss or inJury 
suffered is imperative. Al ong with this underlying theme 
of interdependence is that as expressed by Section 5(1) of the 
Schematic Outline - the balancing of freedom to act within 
their territories and that of the interests of other States . 
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It is clear that expression of this underlying principle 
is expressed in both topics . In the topic of non - navigational 
uses it takes form in the concept of system agreements . 
What is the purpose of system agreements? It is submitted 
t h at like the regime of prevention that promotes construction 
of regimes to regulate without recourse to prohibition , the 
purpose of a system agreement is to regulate use of the inter -
national watercourse system . It does not prohibit , it is 
submitted, system States from carrying out activities within 
their territories . However , if a non - participating system 
State ' s interests might be adversely affected , it has a right 
to participate in the system agreement . If the use involves 
the whole international watercourse system then all system 
States are entitled to participate . 
It is submitted that two points may be derived from 
when system agreements are made . The first is that as in 
the topic of international liability some element of trans-
boundary loss or injury is necessary for a system agreement 
to be concluded . The second is merely the formulation of the 
principle of co - operation between system States and the 
encouragement of system States to work together for the maximum 
benefit of all . It looks at the watercourse system as a 
unitary whole and encourages system States to co-ordinate 
their efforts to attain maximum utilization . It must follow 
that as use is being made of the whole international water-
course system, all system States must be involved . Thus , 
one is no longer in the realm of acts or activities or use 
being made within the territory or control of a system State . 
The use here extends to the whole international watercourse 
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system . In such circumstances, there is a clear need to 
consult all system States as the use affects all their interests . 
It is submitted that this brings one to two conclusions . 
The first is that there is a regime established that arises 
wh en use within the control or territory of a system State 
of t h e international watercourse system affects adversely 
to an appreciable extent the use of another system State . 
Secondly , when one considers the international water -
course system as a whole , a different regime applies and 
n ecessarily so . For how can a system State carry out a 
u se that applies to the whole international watercourse system 
wi t h out cons~lting all the system States? By virtue of the 
v ery nature of the use it proposes , all system States have 
to b e consulted and party to any system agreement concluded . 
The point is that this is a statement of the principle that 
States are to co - operate to attain maximum utilization of 
the resource . For this goal to materialize , all rights and 
interests of affected States must be taken into account . 
The proposed use thus affects all these system States . 
Does the question of an adverse effect of a tran sboundary 
n ature becrnne a determining factor here? 
I t is submitted that the regimes set up by the articles 
are dealing with prospective use . Thus , system agreements 
are concerned with regulating the system States ' interests 
v i s - a - v i s the proposed activi t y . 
Th e point is that it is difficult to take the discussion 
of both the topics in relation to·each other to a further stage 
because the first five a0ticles of the law of non - navigational 
uses of interna tional watercourses do not consider the areas 
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of interest to the paper . Thus, the regimes established 
by Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s topic cannot be considered . Even 
the question , are these rules of a prohibitory nature, is 
h ard to answer . This is because it appears that these arti-
cles will serve as guidelines for States to conclude specific 
agreements for the particular watercourse . It appears 
that States are under an obligation to consider these rules 
when negotiating specific agreements . However, can States 
specifically avoid the articles without committing a·wrong? 
Or is there an obligation to consider these articles on ly 
if States agree to do so? 
It i& submitted that these questions are left better 
answered after the consideration of the concepts of equitable 
participation and appreciable harm . 
On the face of the articles, tentativ e submissions 
may be made. Firstly it appears that system States shall 
not make any use of the watercourse system that would adversely 
affect to an appreciable extent the use of other system States . 
Thu s , in these terms , the approach of the Commis sion seems 
to b e the setting up of prohibitory rules , breach of which 
will entail a right of action . 
Secondly, it may be concluded from our preliminary 
observations that all system States have the right to 
participate in the system agree~ent . This may be the 
embodiment of the principle of an integrated.and co - ordinated 
approach to the use of the international watercourse system . 
The object here 1s the maximum utilization of the watercourse 
system . However, when the concept as expressed was being 
explored , it became obvious that all States had to be included 
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as their various rights and interests woald be affected . 
This then would trigger off an enquiry as to whether in effect 
the only time a system State may participate in a systems 
agreement affecting the whole international watercourse system 
is when it is being affected . The point then is what is 
11 affect 11 here? If a system State receives only a beneficial 
effect by the use , does it need to participate in the agree -
ment? Do not States only enter into negotiations when con -
flicting interests, or uses in this case , arise? Thus, 
could it not be implied from the articles that what is being 
sought by allowing all system States to participate in a system 
agreement afiecting the whole watercourse is more likely to 
be the reconciling of conflicting uses . Does this then not 
take one back to the starting block of the Special Rapporteur 
for injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by inter-
national law - that there must be in the terms used by the 
Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel , use that is adversely affected? 
On the one hand there appears to be a coincidence 
of when the regimes they establish arise - when there is loss 
or in j ury or when a use is adversely affected of a trans -
boundary nature that is of an appreciable extent . 
However , the enquiry cannot be co'ncluded here, in 
respect of when a system agreement embodies use of the whole 
watercourse system . While at first there appears to be a 
wide sweeping principle being stated , the ne~t step is into 
the pragmatic enquiry but exactly when do all system States 
participate? Is this then narrowed down to the fundamental 
po i nt of when a right of interest is affected? But why 
negotiate at all if what is being derived is a benefit? 
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Surely then there must be some conflict, some interest being 
affected in an adverse manner? 
These questions lead on to the next part, where 
through the examination of the concept of neiotiations 
' and system agreements it is hoped that some answer may be found. 
Before concluding there is one further point to be 
considered, that is the concept of ' a shared natural resource '. 
Why have such a concept? It is submitted that such a concept 
fosters rights and duties vis - a-vis States in their relations 
with one another . It is a manner through which the activities 
within the territory or control of a State may be regulated. 
As in the ear~ier part of this chapter , it was noted that 
the shared nqtural resource is one that has a relative character -
it arises when a use is affected . The enquiry of what is 
' affected ' led to the conclusion that it is use that is affected 
to an appreciable extent . 
The concept of a shared natural resource thus arises 
when a use made within the territory of one system State 
affects adversely to an appreciable extent use of another 
system State . It is therefore clear that the scope of 
this topic is very much like that established by 
Mr . Quentin- Baxter in his topic . 
Thus it can be safely concluded that in the case 
of a system State making use of part of the waters of 
an international watercourse system and that'in the case 
of a shared natural resource, the scope of the articles 
is limited to use that adversely affects to an appreciable 
extent . On the question of the use of the whole international 
watercourse system , this conclusion has not yet been 
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arrived at . 
Are these articles establishing prohibitory rules? 
It is submitted that on one interpretation they are . 
If the articles are breached a wrong is committed . 
' 
However , is it a wrong not to take the rules , as established 
by the articles , into consideration when negotiating 
an agreement? The Special Rapporteur stated at the 
beginning of his report that the aim of the topic was 
to provide general principles and rules governing inter -
national watercourses , where there was no agreement 
covering the situation among the system States, and 
i t was also ~o provide guidelines for the negotiation 
of future spe_c ific agreements . 3 9 He went on to say that 
the articles would 4 0 
provide general principles plus residual rules 
applicable to subject matters not covered by 
such agreements . 
What happens if one of these principles or rules is 
breached? Surely the answer must be a right of action . 
What happens if they are not at all observed? Well , 
if they are established principles and rules,surely again 
the answer must be a right of action against the offending 
State . 
In these terms it is clear that unlike the topic 
of acts not prohibited by international law , one is 
constructing h ere,regimes built on the premi~es that 
it is a wrong, a breach of a principle of international 
law , if a particular duty as established by the articles 
is not observed . 
To this extent then there must be a parting of 
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ways between the two topics : as one is attempting to estab-
lish prohibitory principles and rules, breach of which entaiJs 
wrongfulness and the other is in the realm of State liability 
for acts not prohibited . Having said this, it is proposed in 
the next chapter to examine under the concept of equit-
able participation whether in effect the two separate 
regimes ( one dealing with wrongfulness and the other 
divorced from this concept ) can co - exist at the same 
time. 
Th ere is another interpretation of the articles 
that the paper wishes to tentatively propose . Can 
the problem~.that are inherent in these articles be 
put in the context of the principles proposed by the 
topic of liability for acts not prohibited by inter-
national law? It may be worthwhile considering the articles 
from this interpretation . At present a consideration 
of the articles shows that at every point prohibitory 
rules are established . Thus , wrongfulness occurs every 
time they are breached . The proposition now advanced 
is to regard these articles as divorced from wrongfulness . 
Both topics deal with establishing primary rules 
of obligation. The international liability topic, 
however, establishes only one obligation whi~h if breached 
entails wrongfulness . The rest of the obligations do 
not entail a right of action . Wrongfulness'is precluded 
up to the point when the single obligation is breached . 
Applying this to the international watercourses topic , 
can one not arrive at the- conclusion that wrongfulness 
can be precluded until one obligation is breached? 
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PART B. THE DUTY TO NEGOTIATE 
The writer proposes to consider the duty to negotiate 
as a subtopic of this chapter because one cannot fail 
to notice that this duty is given some prominence in 
both topics . 
It is hoped to take a multifaceted approach to 
the whole concept, as it will become obvious that this 
duty does not arise in a vacuum and there are interrelated 
concepts to be considered. To this extent the duty 
to negotiate will serve as an introduction to these concepts 
which play dominant roles in the two topics . 
This part of the paper is divided first into separate 
sections where the duty is considered critically as 
it is presented in the two reports. Because the concept 
of ' agreement' is fundamental to the duty to negotiate 
a third section discussing the case of Lake Lanoux 42 
will be included . 
The duty to negotiate, a critical evaluation 
Non-Navigational Uses Of International \·Jatercourses 
The duty to negotiate will be examined in the 
following manner . The primary question is when does 
it arise? To this extent it is proposed to venture into 
the comments made at the General Assembly and the tentative 
article 16 . The reason for doing this is twofold . 
First it is a means of uncovering-the underlying philosophy 
of this duty; secondly it is hoped that by examining 
the duty one will be able to arrive at a conclusion as 
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to the ambit of the articles . Thus by defining what 
one is negotiating about, it is hoped to show what in 
essence one is dealing with . 
It is clear from article 3(3) and from article 4 
that only if the circumstances require it,is there a 
duty to negotiate . If negotiation is the vehicle or 
procedural device through which system agreements are 
concluded, can one not state the circular argument that 
without system agreements the articles do not apply and 
without negotiations system agreements cannot be concluded. 
However, as negotiations only arise in certain circum-
stances, the~- it is only in those circumstances that 
the articles .apply. 
The articles state the following: 
ArticJe 3 
System Agreements 
3 . In so far as the uses of the international ~atercourses 
system may require, system States shall negotiate 
in good faith for the purpose of concluding 
one or more system agreements. 
Article 4 
Parties to the negotiation and conclusion of system 
agreements 
1 . Every system State of an international watercourse 
system is entitled to participat~ in the negotiation 
of and to become a party to any system agreement 
that applies to that international watercourse 
system as a whole. 
2 . A system State whose use of the waters of an 
international watercourse system may be affected 
to an appreciable extent by the impleientation 
of a proposed system-agreement that · 
applies only to a part of the system 
or to a particular project, prograDrne 
or use is entitled to participate in the 
negotiation of such an agreement, to the 
extent that its use is thereby affected, 
pursuant to article 3 of the present articles . 
There are two points to note: the first, it is 
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submitted is,that the duty to negotiate only arises 
if the proposed use may require the system States to 
do so . Secondly States that may be party to a negotiation 
are all system States where the use applies to the inter-
national watercourse as a whole or where use by non -
participating system States may be adversely affected to 
an appreciable extent . The end result of negotiation 
here i s the concluding of a system agreement or agreements . 
There is a duty to negotiate in good faith . 
I t is relevant to observe the comments made by 
4 3 the delegates at the General Assembly . Some saw the 
obligation to- negotiate as a means of dispute settle-
ment akin to .the principle embodied in article 33 of the 
Charter ( which provides for negotiation as a means of 
peaceful settlement of international disputes ). The 
representative of the delegation from Sweden pointed out 
that 44 
.. . the obligation to negotiate should not be 
considered in the abstract but in relation to 
a dispute or a situation where measures planned 
or undertaken by one basin State might adverse ly 
affect the interest of another basin State; 
n egotiations would, thus , be necessary 
to avoid conflict . 
The interesting point to note about the comments is that 
the delegates saw the duty to negotiate as either a means 
of dispute settlement or as a means of dispute avoidance . 
This encompassed the view that negotiations ~ame into 
existence when there was a conflict of interest, where 
a situation might arise of one State being adversely 
affected . Thus , interr~lated with the concept of negotiations 
was the fact that rights and interests might be adversely 
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affected . It was a unique view of one delegation that 
the duty to negotiate should arise in situations dealing 
with international freshwater resources, '' rather than 
only where conflicting interests made negotiation necessary ": 5 
The norm then, it is submitted , is that for negotiations 
or the duty to negotiate to arise there must be a conflict 
of interests. The question then arises whether in the 
case of a system agreement,that applies to the international 
watercourse as a whole, is the entitlement of every ~ystem 
State to participate in negotiations limited to the 
situa~ion where a conflict of interests arises only. 
Thus, to the~.extent that use of system States is not affected , 
could it not be said that there is no conflict of uses 
situation and therefore no need to participate in the 
negotiations. The very nature of negotiations implies 
a conflict situation. If the conflict is removed , what 
is the purpose of a duty to negotiate? 
It is therefore submitted that the very nature of 
negotiations and of the duty to negotiate imply a dispute 
situatio11 at one end of the scale and a conflict of interests 
at the other end . If this is so , then although States 
are entitled to participate in negotiations of system 
agreements that apply to the international watercourse 
system as a whole, in practical terms it appears that 
unless there is some situation of a conflict ·of uses or a 
use being adversely affecting to an appreciable extent , 
a duty to negotiate will not aris~. 
It is not out of place in this context to turn to 
the tentative draft article 16 . 46 The principles and 
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procedures of this article have two objectives : firstly , 
dispute avoidance and secondly dispute settlement . 
Inbuilt in the article is the concept ' accommodation 
in lieu of dispute '. 47 To promote this underlying theme 
negotiations are broken up into several ' echelons ' to 
forestall the matter hardening into a formal dispute . 48 
Thus , there is first a reasonable period of consultation 
and negotiation to reach an accommodation of the conflict ; 49 
i f accommodation is not achieved a system State may call 
for the creation of an international commission of inquiry . so 
Before this commission i s set up , a system State can convoke 
a period of ~htensified negotiations , not to exceed six 
mont h s . This period is measured starting from the date 
o f the call to establish the commission . 51 On receipt 
of the commission ' s report , negotiations are to be resumed . 52 
If resolution of the d i fference is not achieved within six 
months after receipt of the commission ' s report or that 
t he commission ' s formation or work is frustrated so that no 
report is rendered , a system State may refer the matter to 
conciliation . 53 If conciliation fails to resolve the 
difference within a reasonable time , after giving notice 
and waiting a minimum period of ninety days a system State 
may declare the matter an international dispute . 54 
settlement then comes into existence . 
Dispute 
The situations where system States are guided into 
negotiations are set in article 16 ( 2 )( a ), 16 ( 2 )( b ), 16 ( 2 )( c ) 
and 16 ( 2 )( d ): 
Ca ) A planned or iritend~d use in the future of 
system water by one or more system States shall 
not be ground for denying a right of reasonable 
a n d beneficial use in the present to another system 
State . 
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( b) Pending a determination of equitable use, 
a system State is not obliged to suspend an 
existing beneficial use , except by agreement, unless 
the use is causing or will cause appreciable harm 
to another system State or to the environment . 
In the event that appreciable harm is caused, 
failure to modify the use, to suspend the 
use , or otherwise to abate the cause of 
the appreciable harm at the request of 
another system State subjects the offending 
system State to liability for damages 
and denial of the right of the use . 
( c) Conflicting use of an international watercourse 
system will be made compatible , at the request 
of a system State affected by the conflict, 
by restricting one or more of the uses, 
or by making adjustments to the regime 
of the system, to the degree necessary 
and in a manner calculated to produ ce the 
minimum practical loss of total utilization; 
more ~aluable uses will be given preference 
where other considerations are determined not 
to be _paramount . 
( d ) Where the difference between the system States 
involves the development, protection or control 
of the international watercourse system, the 
above principles, mutatis mutandis , shall apply . 
It is submitted that this article brings out the primary 
aim of negotiations under this topic and that is : ' dispute 
avoidance '. 
article 16 : 
However , there is a fundamental principle in 
using the terminology of Mr. Quentin-Baxter 
it is only when loss or injury is prospective or actual 
that there is a duty to negotiate . 
Thus , in a survey of the duty to negotiate, it is 
submitted , the writer arrives at the conclus{on that even 
in a situation where the system agreement applies to an 
international watercourse system as a whole, 'the underlying 
philosophy is that it is only when loss or injury is prospective 
is there a duty to negotiate. Thus, this duty in itself 
defines when the present articles are applicable : the 
fundamental or underlying theme is therefore when a situation 
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of harm , loss or injury, or use that is adversely affected 
to an appreciable extent is prospective, then the duty 
to negotiate arises . 
An ancillary point should be noted . Under article X 
which deals with the relationship between the present 
articles and other treaties in force, paragraph 3 of article 3 
is held applicable even in the situation where other treaties 
are in force . 
Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of article 3, 
the provisions of the present articles do not 
affect treaties in force relating to a particular 
international watercourse system or any part 
thereof or particular project, programme or use . 
Thus ; ·~he duty to negotiate in good faith is being 
established as a principle that must be complied with in 
every situation governing the law of non-navigational uses 
of watercourses, where it is required. 55 
Finally as it has been observed, the end-result of 
the duty to negotiate is a system agreement . 
What happens if a system agreement is not concluded? 
Article 16 suggests that a dispute then arises . Since 
it was noted that system agreements seem to deal with the 
area of prospective use, what are the obligations of the 
system States? Can a system State carry out the proposed 
activity or is it prohibited from so doing until an agreement 
is negotiated? 
delegate that 56 
What about the view raised by the German 
stage . 
the very concept of a duty to negotiate seemed 
likely to conflict with the sovereign rights 
of every State over its territory and its 
national resources. 
These questions are better left unanswered at this 
They will be considered in th~ concluding section . 
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As it has been noted, the articles apply to prospective 
use , where the situations require that there is a duty 
to negotiate . 
However, under the proposed article 10 of the sub-
topic on environmental protection and pollution , the 
d uty to negotiate arises when a particular harm is 
prospective as well as actual. Further , it is question -
able whether a system agreement is the end result sought 
or whether it is various regimes to be applied according 
to the given state of affairs . The focus here is the 
h arm and not use . Thus article 10 (11) states : 
I n the event that abatement or mitigation of 
specific pollution , or a particular programme 
for the ~rotection of the environment , is 
requ ired by one or more system States in 
order to achieve compliance with the provisions 
of this article , the system States concerned 
s hall negotiate with a view to arriving 
at an agreed timetable and efficacious 
measures for the accomplishment 
of the abatement , mitigation or 
programme , or at alternative arrangements 
sufficient for the purpose , as appropriate . 
In the area of ' hazards ' the term used is consult 
rather than negotiate . It is submitted here the emphasis 
is on co - operation towards prevention of harm . In strict 
terms the duty to negotiate here does not exist because 
there does not exist the element of reconciling 
conflicting interests , neither is a regime of reparation 
envisaged if harm does occur . 
Article 11 deals with the prevention and mitigation 
of hazards . 
to consult 
There is under article 11 ( 3 )( b ) a duty 
concerning joint measures , structural and non -
structural , where such measures might be more 
effective than measures undertaken.by the system 
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States individually . 
Thus , an article on the duty to negotiate a regime of 
reparation when loss or injury is suffered along the 
lines provided by the Special Rapporteur, Mr . Quentin - Baxter , 
might indeed be invaluable . It is questionable whether 
l oss or injury should be limited to that caused by a ' human ' 
activity or by accident but not by 1 natural phenomena 1 • 
The International Law Association in 1972 approved ar.ticles 
on flood control. 57 Under article 7 : 5 8 
A basin State is not liable to pay compensation 
for damage caused to another basin State 
by flooqs originating in that basin State 
unl ess i~ has acted contrary to what could 
be reasonably expected under the circumstances , 
and unless the damage caused is substantial . 
Articl e 11 of the report on the law of non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses states : 
1 . System States shall co- operate on an equitable 
ba s is with a view to the prevention or mitigation 
of water-related hazardous conditions and 
occurrences such as flood , ice accumulation , 
erosion, sediment transport , avulsion , 
saltwater intrusion , obstruction , deficient 
drainage and drought , as the circumstances 
of the particular international 
watercourse system warrant . 
As no provision is made when harm or loss or injury 
is actually suffered , the provision as set down by Section 4 
of the international liability topic is valuable . 
Thu s , the Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel , noted 
before considering the International Law Asso~iation ' s 
articles : 5 9 
Detailed, unifor~ rules applicable to all international 
wat ercourses would be chimerical . ' Besides , nearly 
all hydraulic works , ·whether carried out for flood-
control purposes alone or combined with other purposes , 
produce multiple secondary effects ... ' But the 
dev elopment even of general principles had been 
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neglected by the international legal community . 
The Committee ' s articles were therefore , 
' an effort to fill an obvious gap in 
international water law and thereby to 
contribute to mitigation of human suffering caused 
by human omission to control nature ' . :; 
It i s submitted that , divorced from the concept of 
wrongfulness working from the basis that ' all harm is not 
wrongful ', an article should be established that in 
case of transboundary harm that is caused , by ' hazards ', 
a duty to negotiate a regime of reparation will arise . 
The point is that in such situations ' wrongfulness ' and 
strict liability will be absent . Instead , negotiations 
will establi£h whether a reparation should be made to 
the affected State taking all factors into consideration . 
Article 13 is titled "h'ater resources and installation 
safety". 
Here6 0 
Again the article aims at preventing harm. 
destructive or contaminating actions taken 
during armed conflict , the acts of sabotage 
by terrorists are more than ever before 
of prime concern . 
Thus, prohibition of use of water resources and 
hydrauli c installations and other facilities, associated 
with an international watercourse system and ea able 
of releasing dangerous forces or substances 
in offensive military operations and terrorist acts of 
sabotage is the basic goal of the article . ·The article 
i s limited to shared water resource . There is no duty 
to consult or enter into negotiations but a system State 
may request consultations with a view to reaching agreement . 
The article does not provide for ihe situation where loss 
or injury does occur . However , the Special Rapporteur 
did foresee States having three sorts of liability, on~ 1 
t;my emphasis 
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... for failure to fulfil a special duty to use 
due diligence and foresight to ward off the person 
or persons, even including in some cases insurgents 
or foreign military . 
The other 6 2 
... a separate duty; absolute unless excused, 
would of course apply to the system State ' s 
own actions of this kind of wilful nature . 
Finally: 6 3 
There might also be absolute liability attaching 
to certain types of installations, notably 
atomic installations. 
In the second situation one is concerned with a 
State being engaged in an illegal activity . To that 
extent one is not within the scope of the topic of 
Mr . Quentin-Baxter. 
However; in the case of the atomic installation 
without determining the question of wrongfulness or 
i llegality , is it not possible to provide for reparation , 
in every situation where loss or injury is suffered by 
a system State due to the atomic installations . Should 
a treaty akin to the Space Objects Convention not govern 
this situation? 
The ' duty to negotiate ' international liability for conseouences 
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law 
One i s first introduced to the concept of negotiation , 
by the Special Rapporteur in Chapter 3 of his Preliminary Report . E 4 
Here, while discussing ' legjtimate interests·and multiple 
fact ors ', h e said : 6 5 
The first emphasis , however , is on the duty to negotiate : 
the applicable rule ·Of law itself requires the parties 
to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving . 
at a n agreement, and not merely to go through 
a formal process of negotiaiion as a sort 
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of prior condition for the automatic application of 
a certain method of delimitation in the absence of 
agreement 
Later on, he stated that the above rule, that is the 
duty to negotiate with a view to arriving at an agreement , 
is itself 
an expression of a binding rule of customary law -
even though the rule is of great generality . 66 
In his Second Report 67 when considering ' Elements in 
striking a balance of interests ' he quoted from the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case the following passage : 68 
The most appropriate method for the solution of the 
dispute is clearly that of negotiation ... It is 
i mplicit in the concept of preferential rights that 
n egotiitlons are required in order to define or delimit 
th e extent of those rights . . . The obligation to 
negotiate ... flows from the very nature of the 
respective rights of the Parties; to direct them 
to neg otiate is therefore a proper exercise of the 
judicial function in this case . ' 
What one derives from these statements is that there is 
something established in customary international law that 
is known as the duty to negotiate . When does this duty 
arise? It arises when parties find themselves in a 
situation where they have conflicting interests . But 
does this duty arise prior to a ' dispute' or is it a 
means of avoiding a dispute? Thus , is ~he duty to negotiate 
primarily a first step towards resolving and reconciling 
a conflict of interests? Is it therefore a means of 
dispute avoidance? There is also the factoP of arriving 
at an agree~ent . This appears to be the end result of 
the duty to negotiate . What happens if parties do not 
arrive or cannot arrive at an agreement? Is this when 
a dispute arises? Connected with this is the question 
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of whether the duty to negotiate is merely a method of 
fact finding, of defining and delimiting the parties ' 
rights or whether it is something more : that as rights 
are established, along the proces of negotiations, various 
regimes are set up which allow the parties to act in accor-
dance with them ; the final aspect of negotiations is 
the conclusion of an agreement, breach of which will 
provide a right of action . This last conclusion leads 
to a more fundamental point if there is a duty to negotiate , 
then breach of that duty must entail a right of action . 
The last question to be asked is: why was this duty 
considered u-n-der the rubric of what can generally be termed 
the ' balancing of interests ' ? The answer to this is 
apparent ; multiple factor , or the factors that constitute 
how one is to arrive at evaluating the activity in question, 
provide the guidelines and set the standards that are to 
be met while negotiating . 
of the negotiations . 
Thus , they dictate the course 
These preliminary questions serve as a basis towards 
how the duty to negotiate will be considered under the 
Special Rapporteur ' s topic . 
Before considering the Sections, an important point 
to recall is the underlying theme of the rules as established 
by Section 5 of the Schematic Outline . 
1 . The aim and purpose of the present a~ticles is to 
ensure to acting States as much freedom of choice, in 
relation to activities within their territory or control , 
as is compatible with adequate protection for the interests of affected States . 
There are three Sections in the ScheQatic Outline that 
will be considered in relation to this duty (Sections 3 , 
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4 and 2 ). The first Section to be considered 1s Section 3. 
The first observation that may be advanced on Section 3 
1s that it deals with the situation where the loss or 1nJury 
has not yet occurred . Thus , one is here concerned with 
the regime of prevention . Reparation is not excluded from 
this regime , indeed if on a balance of interests the proposed 
activity is to be carried out , then reparation ( together 
with all measures of prevention ) may be the solution to 
loss or injury. Section 3 ( 1 ) establishes when the duty 
to negotiate arises . 
Under Section ll) ( a) , it is submitted that the duty to negotiate 
1s regarded ~s a means of expediently resolving a conflict 
of interests. 
If (a) it does not prove possible within a reasonable 
time either to agree upon the establishment 
and terms of reference of fact-finding machinery 
of for the fact-finding machinery to complete 
its terms of reference . 
Section 3 ( l )( b ), it is submitted, sets down two criteria 
when the duty will arise . The first arises when any State 
concerned "i s not satisfied with the findings " presumably 
of the fact - finding machinery set-up ; the second is when 
any State concerned "believes that other matters should 
be taken into consideration" . Thus , it· is submitted under 
this subsection as opposed to subsection 3 ( l )( a ) a course 
of consultations has already begun ; negotiations come as 
a second stage. 
Finally under subsection 3 ( l )( b ), it is submitted, 
the duty to negotiate arises if the fact - finding machinery 
recommends it. As this is advice only, the States are 
under no obligation to enter into negotiations . 
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However, the subsection expressly states that if the 
fact-finding machinery recommends it, the duty to negotiate 
will arise if any one of the States concerned requests it . 
( c ) the report of the fact - finding machinery so recommends, the States concerned have a duty to enter into negotiations 
Thus, in the case of a prospective activity the above 
sets down when the duty arises . The next point to consider 
is what is the end result of negotiations here? 
The end result of negotiations here is not exactly arriving 
at an agreement, it is submitted . Negotiations as Sec tion 3(l)(c)· 
states are to be entered "with a view to determining whether 
a regime is _necessary what form it should take" . While agree-
ment is not precluded from this phrase and Section 3 ( 3 ) clearly 
envisages this , what exactly is the outcome sought by negotiations 
here? Is it a process by which one evaluates the proposed 
activity according to the principles set down in Section 5 , 
the relevant factors set down in Section 6 and further relevant 
matters established in Section 7 , only to conclude that no 
regime need be established and that the 'proposing State may 
carry out its activity? This end result , in itself , it is 
submitted , is the conclusion of an agreement . 
Negotiations culminate in agreement if they are seen as 
a means of allowing the proposing State to carry out the activity 
and should loss or injury arise then to negotiate a regime 
to deal with the situation . The problem he~e is what exactly 
does ' regime ' mean? Is it·a s e tting down in exact terms of 
what would happen if loss or injury should occur? Is a regime 
in this section only to come into existence if the acting State , 
after all relevant factors are taken into account , is hel'd 
liable in case of loss or injury? Thus , the setting up of 
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a regime to deal with the situation will only be considered 
necessary if loss or injury is attributable to the acting State 
after due conside ration to all principles and factors. 
It is submitted that the aim of the duty to negotiate is 
twofold. It is first concerned with evaluating the proposed 
activity with reference to the relevant sections. 
In the case of an activity which has to be carried out 
urgently and of loss or injury that might occur to the affected 
State, a regime might be ne e ded to be established at once. 
However, if liability cannot be imputed to th e acting State 
is there a necessity for a regime? 
Thus , iT- alternative methods may be found of carrying 
out the same _activity, so that loss or injury will not be suffered 
then a regime need not be set up. 
The secor1d aim of negotiation is, then, it is submitted, 
to decide if a regime is necessary and this nee d only be decided 
if loss or injury may still arise and if liability may still 
be imput e d to the acting State . 
The underlying theme of the duty to negotiat e , here , 
it is submitted, is dispute avoidance. Before a situation 
of 'dispute' arises, States are urged to reconcile the ir dif-
ferences. 
Section 4 deals with the situation where loss or injury 
does occur and there is no agreeme nt betwe en the States that 
covers the situation. Here, the States conderned have a duty 
to negotiate in good faith and to come to an agreement . Again 
these negotiations are to be carried out in accordance with 
Section 5 and Sections 6 and 7·where relevant . 
The main factor here is reparation for loss or inJury 
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suffered . However, the point to note is that under Section 4, 
it is submitted , reparation may in fact never be made . 
There are two situations, it is submitted , where reparation 
may not be made : 
1 if " loss or inJury of that kind or character is not in 
accordance with the shared expectations of those States "; 
or 
2 i f according to the principles set in Section 5 and on 
a balance of in t erests States are held not liable for 
th e act i vity that caused loss or inJury . 
Thus , even under the regime set up in this topic , States may 
not be liabl~_for injurious consequences for acts not prohibite d . 
Does the innocent victim then have to bear loss? It is submitted 
that h e h as to . Th e only difference in this situation is 
that h e is more like t he sacrificial lamb - being slaughtere d 
for a greater good . 
Th e danger , it i s submitted , of these provisions is that 
one is in th e realm of acts n o t prohibited . Thus , while a 
regime of strict liability ma y not be desired , these provisions 
could prove to be a l oophole for States to use and thus deny 
liabil i ty . 
Wh at then is the purpose of negotiation here? Is it to 
establish that no wrong has been committed and thus no reparation 
should be tendered? I s it to prove t hat every adequate measure 
had been taken and that therefore one is not liable to c ompensate 
for loss or i n j ury suffered? Why n egotiate? To find that 
shared expectations are different and therefore there is no 
need to pay for loss or i njury~ These observations do not do 
j ust i ce to what t h e Special Rapporteur is seeking to establish . 
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Of prime importance is the fact that loss or injury has been 
suffered . The moment this is established there is an obligation 
to reach a negotiated settlement . Reparation for loss or injury 
suffered is the prime concern in negotiations. Mitigating 
factors that would decrease reparation due or factors that 
would indeed cancel it out all together would be weighed up 
in the negotiation process . 
successful is agreement . 
The result if negotiations are 
Thus, what appropriate reparation (if reparation is to 
be made ) in a given situation would be is arrived at by both 
parties negotiating . In negotiations the relevant factors 
such as prio~_ negotiations , failure of prior co-operation, 
exchange of information and the all important principles set 
down in Section 5 and the factors in Sections 6 and 7 will 
be considered as establishing the relevant standards to be 
observed when negotiating . 
Before concluding , Section 2 should be considered because 
it is relevant to the question : at what point of time can 
negotiations be said to have commenced? It is submitted that 
the various steps that States may take under Section 2(5) can 
be interpreted as negotiations at its preliminary stages . 
Thus , it is submitted , negotiations commence the moment States 
enter into dialogue on what their various rights and obligations 
are vis - a-vis each other and how these may be reconciled. 
The Special Rapporteur saw this when he ~aid : 69 
There is a preliminary phase of consultation and fact -
finding without substantive commitment by the States 
concerned. There is a second phase of negotiation 
among those States to establish a regime reconciling 
their conflicting interests ... 
Thus negotiations, it is submitted , may be divided into stages ; 
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consultations for example are negotiations at the preliminary 
stages . 
It could be asked whether these preliminary negotiations 
or consultations could not end in agreement at this initial 
stage itself . Thus, if remedial measures proposed by 
the acting State are accepted by the affected State or 
if the States decide to accept solutions of the fact -
finding machinery could it not be then said that negotiations 
have been successfully concluded? 
In conclusion , it is submitted that the duty to 
negotiate here is primarily seen as a means of dispute 
avoidance . ···rt occurs in both regimes set up by the 
Special Rapporteur - regime of prevention and reparation , 
regime of reparation . By establishing principles and 
factors that are to be taken into consideration, negotiations 
are directed in a certain course and certain standards 
have to be complied with. 
Who initiates negotiations? Eith~r acting or affected 
States may . How are negotiations to be carried out? 
Either States may negotiate among themselves or they may 
turn to a third party (either an institution or person ) 
to help them reconcile their conflict . 
In negotiations concerning prospective acts, the 
Special Rapporteur states that parties should enter 
negotiations with a view to . ' determining whether a regime 
is necessary '. What is a regime , where does ' agreement ' 
fit into this concept? Is coming to a decision whether 
a regime exists or not in itself an agreement? It is 
submitted that it is. Can a regime exist if liability 
cannot be i mputed to a State? 
Finally there is one rather disturbing point of a preliminary 
nature . Under Section 3 , in particular , is it indeed correct 
to speak of a ' duty to negotiate ' ? The Section ends thus : 
"Failure to take any step required by the rules contained 
in this Section shall not in itself give rise to any right 
of action .'' If t his is so , States are not under an obligation 
to negot i ate , there is no duty to do so . Thus , can there 
exist a ' d uty ' if breach of not carrying it out does· not entail 
a right to seek redress? 
the nature of the topic . 
It is here that one must recall 
What one is concerned with is to 
try to estah:J:-jsh regimes to regulate activities that States 
are perfectly entitled to carry out . The main focus of the 
topic is on the loss or injury that may occur or occurs . 
One is working from the premise that ' all harm is not wrongful '. 
Therefore , imposing a duty to negotiate in a situation where 
the activity has not yet been undertaken may be an unwanted 
fetter on the State ' s sovereign right to carry out activities 
within its territory or control . 
The duty to negotiate - Lake Lanoux 
Lake Lanoux deals with a prospective· activity . The 
case is reported at the arbitration stage . 
Th e facts br i efly were that the French government proposed 
to utilize the waters of Lake Lanoux in connection with a 
hydroelectricity scheme . Spain felt its rights and interests 
as established by the Treaty of Bayonne of May 26 , 1866 and 
the Additional Act of the . same.date would be adversely affected . 
The Spanish claim was that under the Treaty t h e proposed 
activities could not be undertaken withcut prior agreement . 
It is from this aspect of prior agreement that the duty to 
negotiate is considered in Lake Lanoux . 
The Lake Lanoux arbitration of 1957 brought to an end 
negotiations that had started in 1917 . It represented some 
twenty- one years spent in negotiations (World Wars between 
1930 and 1949 represent some nineteen years of stopped 
negotiations) . 
The case itself is not directly on the duty to negotiate; 
it is partly on the question of prior agreement of a proposed 
activ i ty . The question of prior agreement , it is submitted , 
is of vital :importance to the duty to negotiate . This is 
because if one sees the object of negotiation as the arriving 
at an agreement between the parties, when in the case of 
prospective works, proposed schemes or activities must an 
agreement be reached? Must agreement between the parties 
be reached before the works are commenced? 
It is on this last query that the Tribunal began 
considering the second question . 
The Tribunal ' s opinion will be examined in the following 
manner : 
1 relevant general observations ; 
2 re l evant specific conclusions . 
It is then proposed to look at the ancillary point of what 
might be termed ' riglrts and interests '. 
Th e Tribunal reduced the dispute between the States to 
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two fundamental questions . The first was whethe r or 
not Spanish rights as established by the Treaty of Bayonne 
of May 26 , 1866 and the Additional Act of the same 
date had been infringed by the French hydroelectric 
scheme . 
7 0 
The Tribunal held that 
the diversion with restitution as envisaged 1n 
the French scheme and proposals is not contrary to 
the Treaty and to the Additional Act of 1866. 
The second question was considered in detail by the 
7 l 
Tribunal : 
If the reply to the preceding question be negative, 
does the execution of the said works constitute 
an infringement of the provisions of the 
Treaty of Bayonne of May 26, 1866 , and 
of the Apditional Act of the same date, 
because those provisions would in any 
event make such execution subject to 
a prior agreement between the two Governments 
or because other rules of Article 11 of 
the Additional Act conce rning dealings 
between the two Governments have not been 
observed . 
The Tribunal felt that the Spanish government saw two 
obligations on the State desiring to undertake works; 
the first and more important was the obligation to reach 
a prior agreement with the other interested State; 
the second was " ... merely accessory thereto, b e ing 
in respect to other rules laid down by Article 11 
of the Additional Act . 7 2 
The Tribunal first made several general 6bservations on 
this ' obligation ' of prior agreement . 7 3 
To admit that jurisdiction in a c e rtain field can no 
longer be exercised exc e pt on the condition of, or by 
way of, an agreement between two States, is to place 
an essential restriction on tDe sovereignty of a 
State, and such restriction could only be a d~itted 
if there were clear and convincing evidence . 
The Tribunal felt that judicial recognition of the 
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restriction would be slow even in the light of evidence, 
as the underlying fe~ would be whether the terTitorial 
sovereignty of a State was being impaired , 74 
Prior agreement is conceptualized by the Tribunal as 
something that infringes on a State ' s sovereignty. 
Beginning from the premise that States may not be able 
to reach agreement, if prior agreement was essential, 
a ' veto ' exercised by an interested State could paralyse 
the right of the proposing State to exercise its own 
territorial jurisdiction: 75 
In effect, in order to appreciate in its essence the 
necessity for prior agreement, one must envisage the 
hypothe~is in which the interested States cannot reach 
agreement , In such a case, it must be admitted that 
the Sta~e which is normally competent has lost its 
right to act alone as a result of the unconditional 
and arbitrary opposition of another State . This 
amounts to admitting a ' right of assent ' , a ' right 
of veto ' , which at the discretion of one State 
paralyses the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction 
of another . 
However , it is submitted that while this might be true as 
a general observation, one must consider the question in 
the context of an activity that has the potential of causing 
harm or injurious consequences in another State ' s territory . 
Is reaching prior agreement an infringement of sovereignty 
or merely an application of the various ·principles as expressed 
in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas, or in 
the abuse of right principle and the goodneighbourship 
principle, all of which limit the complete f~eedom of action 
of a State? 
The Tribunal continues : 76 
That is why international· practice prefers to resort to 
less extreme solutions by confining itself to obliging 
the States to seek , by preliminary negotiations , 
terms for an agreement , without subordinating 
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the exercise of their competences to the conclusion 
of such an agreement . Thus, one speaks, although 
often inaccurately, of the ' obligation of negotiating 
an agreement '. In reality, the engagements 
thus undertaken by States take very diverse 
forms and have a scope which varies according 
to the manner in which they are defined and 
according to the procedures intended for their 
execution; but the reality of the obligations 
thus undertaken is incontestable and sanctions 
can be applied in the event , for example, of 
an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, 
abnormal delays, disregard of the agreed procedures, 
systematic refusals to take into consideration 
adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally , 
in cases of violation of the rules of good faith ~ 
Thus , arriving at an agreement is not confined to 
preliminary negotiations . The role of negotiations, 
it is submitf~d , appears more to be the crystallization 
of the conflicting interests at any given point in time. 
Negotiations , thus , keep the dialogue or communications 
between States moving . It is an ongoing , dynamic concept 
and well before an agreement is concluded it establishes 
at any given point in time the particular status of the 
parties and the corresponding regimes that particular 
status brings with it . Thus , breach of an agreed pro-
cedure entails a right of action . Further , negotiations 
must be carried on in good faith etc . , again breach 
of t h e rules of good faith will entail sanctions . 
Thus , here , there is a right of action if any of the 
obligations set down by negotiations are broken . 
Turning to the specific problem before i~ , the Tribunal 
considered the necessity of·a prior agreement . It 
picks u p the themes established in its general observations . 
Thus , it observed and concluded that it was more than 
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desirable that States should conclude comprehensive 
agreements that took into consideration all conflicting 
interests . However, customary international law and 
indeed as a general principle of international law, 
there did not exist an obligation of prior agreement 
before industrial use was made of the international 
7 7 watercourse . 
Considering Article 11 which sets down an "obligation to 
furnish information" it stated that there was a vast· 
difference between the obligation to give notice and 
that of prior agreement . It made the observa tion that 
giving noticE would allow the affected State to safeguard 
the rights of its riparian owners to be compensa ted and safeguard 
. . f . bl 7 8 its general interests as ar as possi e . . 
Obtaining agreement was far more extensive and would 
allow the affected State to exercise its power of veto .79 
On a 6onsideration of Articles 15 and 16 of the 
Additional Act, the Tribunal concluded that these articles 
established that there80 
does exist a duty of consultation and bringing into 
harmony the respective actions of the t~o States 
when general intere sts are involved in matters 
concerning waters . 
This, however , did not establish an obligation to enter into 
prior agreement . 
Finally the diplomatic correspondence used in the 
negotiations was considered . The Tribunal felt that 
when considering such negotiations which had taken place 
over a long period of time and had at various stages been 
suspended and resumect, certain principles should be taken 
into account . Citing the North Atlantic Fisheries (1910 ) Case, 
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the Anglo - Norwegian Fisheries ( 1951 ) Case and the 
Case concerning the [ Rights of ] United States Nationals 
in Morocco (1952), the Tribunal stated: 81 
... one must not seize upon isolated expressions or 
ambiguous attitudes which do not alter the legal positions 
taken by States . All negotiations tend to take on 
a global character; they bear at once upon rights -
some recognized and some contested - and upon 
interests ; it is normal that when considering 
adverse interests a Party does not show intransigence 
with respect to all of its rights . Only 
thus can it have some of its own interests 
taken into consideration . 
Further, in order for negotiations to proceed in a 
favourable climate, the Parties must consent to suspend 
t h e full exercise of their rights during the negotiations . 
I t is normal that they should enter into engagements 
to this effect . If these engagements were 
to bind them unconditionally until the conclusion 
of an agreement , they would, by signing them , 
lose the very right to negotiate ; this cannot be 
presumed . 
Th us , i t is submitted , inherent in negotiations is the 
aspect of considering all factors relevant to the dispute ; 
the ' global character ' of negotiations is another manner 
of expressing the balance of interests concept . 
However , it is queried if by ' suspend the full exercise 
of their rights ' the Tribunal could have meant that each 
time negotiations were carried out the acting State had 
to suspend execution of the proposed works . Thus , in 
a preceding observation , the Tribunal said that a party 
• 8 2 
to a dispute 
... is never obliged to suspend the exercise of its 
j urisdiction because of the dispute exc~pt when it 
assumes an obligation to do so; by exercising its 
j urisdiction it takes Lhe risk of seeing its international 
responsibility called into question , if it is establjshed 
that it did not act within the limits of its rights . 
Thi s last observation is _of importance because , it is 
subm i tted , it establishes the concept that once the Parties 
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recognize certain obligations vis-a-vis each other (irres-
pective of the fact that previously no obligation existed 
between them), they are bound to observe those obligations . 
Breach of the obligation will entail a right of action . 
Thus , voluntary acceptance of an obligation brings with 
it a right of action, if the obligation is breached. 
A final point to be derived from Lake Lanoux, for the 
purposes of this paper, is a facet of the concept of rights 
and interests. The important question here is who decides 
when a right or interest is affected? The Tribunal said : 8 3 
A State which is liable to suffer repercussions from 
work undertaken by a neighbouring State is the sole 
judge of its interests; and if the neighbouring 
State has not taken the initiative, the other 
State cannot be denied the right to insist 
on notification of works or concessions which 
are the object of a scheme . 
It is submitted that in a situation where rights and 
interests are not defined the affected State has a right 
to have its interests taken into account and compensation 
paid if its interests are prejudiced . 
Conclusion 
In drawing the threads together of the three sections, 
it is on the question of agreement that.focus must be placed . 
It is indisputable that both Special Rapporteurs use 
the duty to negotiate as a device through which system 
State or States may reconcile their conflic~ing interests 
or at the very least have their various rights and interests 
defined so that in a dispute situ~tion negotiations will 
serve as material for the adj~dicating body to base its 
opinion on . This last purpose was illustrated in Lake Lanoux . 
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In the non-navigational uses of watercourses topic 
the end result of negotiationsis the conclusion of a system 
agreement or agreements . The articles it was observed 
were dealing with prospective situations. Thus , it is 
submitted , what is here advocated is prior agreement between 
system States before an activity is carried out . But 
is not prior agreement an infringement on a State ' s sovereignty? 
Was this not the conclusion of Lake Lanoux? 
Lake Lanoux is pertinent to this topic because it was 
dealing specifically with the situation of a non - navigational 
use of a watercourse that had transborder effects . At 
the beginnin_g of the negotiations these effects were of gravity . 
France proposed plans then which could have caused injurious 
consequences or affected Spain ' s use adversely and to an 
appreciable extent . Through negotiations , France changed 
her plans and in the end Spain ' s interests not rights were 
affected . If anything , Spain was deriving a benefit from 
the proposed activity . However , agreement could not be 
reached and it was a hardened dispute tHat the Tribunal had 
to deal with . Prior agreement , as the Tribunal saw it , 
could allow another State at its discretion to paralyse the 
exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of another . The 
Tribunal found that neither in customary international law 
nor in international law in general was there an obligation 
to reach prior agreement where industrial us~ was being ~ade 
of waters . More generally· the underlying theme of the 
Tribunal ' s decision was that prior agreement would place 
a restr i ction on a State 's sovereignty and that to recognize 
its existence ( unless there was clear and convincing evidence ) 
would amount to admitting a right of veto which at the 
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discretion of one State paralyses the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction of another . The Tribunal said that even 
in the light of evidence judicial recognition would be slow . 
The fact is,under the non-navi gational uses topic, there 
is clear evidence that prior agre e ment is required before 
the proposed activity may take place . 
In Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s topic , the underlying principle 
of the sections was expressed in Section 5(1 ). There was 
recognition of State sovereignty as well as the af f ected State 's 
rights . Prior agreement was not seen as necessary before 
a proposed activity could be carried out . However , if 
injurious consequences were to occur , agreement for the 
establishing .of a regime if necessary was desirable . 
The question that will have to be asked at this stage 
is again one of a preliminary nature . Is the Special Rapporte~r , 
Mr . Schwebel , saying that all prospective activities that have 
adverse effect of an appreciable extent to another system 
State are illegal and therefore cannot be carried out without 
prior agreement? 
is of this nature? 
Who is to decide that the proposed use 
Will this not effectively introduce what 
the Tribunal feared would happen, allowing one State a power 
of veto over another ' s jurisdiction? Moreover is it not 
using th e simplistic equation that "all harm.is wrongful "? 
The fact is that the articles as they stand point to the 
conclusion that they are establishing prohibitory rules , breach 
of which will entail wrongfulness . What is more , system 
agreements certainly can be equated to the concept of prior 
agreement . If this is sb, one is left with the enquiry -
but what about a system State~s sovereign rights? The articles 
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as they are framed seem to do away with them . This is a 
dangerous conclusion because in effect it gives rise to the 




This chapter proposes to consider the concept of equitable 
participation and the interrelated concept of equitable use . 
The first part of the chapter follows the path taken by the 
Specia l Rapporteur, Mr . Schwebel, to arrive at the formulation 
of the equitable participation principle . The reason for 
doing this is again to discover the underlying philosophy 
of the concept . The article will then be critically examined . 
And so will the article on equitable use . The purpose of 
doing this i$ __ to answer a question posed in the first chapter: 
can the concepts of wrongfulness and that of liability for 
acts not prohibited co - exist? To be able to answer this, 
however , it will be first considered whether article 6 as 
it is framed is a prohibitory rule or whether it is framed in 
terms divorced from wrongfulness . 
Part A. The underlying philosophy of the concept of ' equitable 
2art icipation' 
To arrive at draft article 6 , the Special Rapporteur 
considered the concept of equitable participation by: ( 1) 
tracing the development of the general principle (2) reviewing 
international agreement and the positions of States and (3) 
reviewing the current state of the doctrine . The writer 
proposes to follow this same path asking the question : what 
is the underlying philosophy, the paison d ' @tre, behind this 
concept? 
The Special Rapporteur began by considering the concept 
56 
of equitable participation . 84 He stated that 85 
aseG 
There may be, asid e from the rule that no State may 
cause appre cia ble har m to anoth e r State, no more widely 
accepted principle in the law of the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses than that 
each system State 'is entitled, within its territory, 
to a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial 
uses of the waters ... '. 
The concept finds its origins in other concepts such 
territorial integrity, absolute sovereignty, li.mi ted 
territorial sovereignty, and community in waters -
and can be seen to have evolved gradually into 
its contemporary expression, equitable utilization . 
National practice, particularly in the area of adjudi-
cations within federal States gives ea rly indications of 
the formulating of the principle . 87 The important point 
to note, as the Special Rapporteur indicated, was that the 
principle was linked with a finding of injury. 88 
However, this was further developed to give rise to 
the concept of " equality of rights" . This concept took 
into account the rights of the State de riving the b e ne f it 
as against those of the State deprived of some use by virtue 
of the first State ' s use. 
To illustrate this stage of development , the 
Special Rapporteur quoted from a judgement from the 
United States Supreme Court: 89 
[ there must be adjustme nt ] up on the basis of equality 
of rights as to secure as far as possible to the 
Colorado the benefi t s of irri ga tion witho ut depriving 
Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing 
stream. 
It is submitted that a balancing of interest concept 
thus found expression and gre~ to be an integral part 
of the concept of equitable participation . While taking 
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into account the rights of each State, the Court was 
simultaneously weighing up the beneficial aspects and 
the detrimental aspects that a particular use by a 
system State may have on another system State ' s use . 
Thus the balancing of interests became a determining 
factor of equitable participation. 
The Special Rapporteur observed : 90 
In short, disputes over the right to use waters 
flowing across sovereign lines must be adjusted 
on the basis of ' equality of rights ' . But such 
equality does not necessarily mean equal division. 
The writer agrees that the American cases 91 and 
the example of the Report of the Ind us ( Rau) Commission 9 2 
which the Special Rapporteur uses supports the point 
that ' equality of right ' does not necessarily mean 
equal division . However, it is submitted that another 
point is being made by the Lake Lanoux arbitration . 93 
It confirms the obligation to reconcile the various 
interests by applying a balancing of interest type test . 
However , another point is being made: States have 
an equality of rights in relation to their respective 
status as system States . As system States, they stand 
on an equal footing . However, in rela~ion to the matter 
they were disputing, it is clear from the case that 
France by the proposed use of the waters was exercising 
her rights . However , it was not Spanish ri~hts that 
were affected but something.that was less than a right, 
an interest . 
it said : 9 4 
The Tribunal expressed this point when 
France may use its rights; it may not disregard 
Spanish interests . Spain may demand respect 
for its rights and consideration of its interests . 
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I t is submitted that the American cases as wel l 
as the opinion of the Italian Court of Cassation establish 
the above point - that equality of rights relates to 
the fact that each system State stands on an equal basis . 
Their vari ous rights must be considered and inherent 
in thi s i s the concept of weigh ing the various rights 
that may be affected . 
gave th is opi n i on : 95 
The Italian Co urt of Cassation 
International law recognizes the right on the 
par t of every r i parian State to enjoy , as a 
participant in a kind of partnership created 
by t he r i ver , all the advantages derivi ng 
fr om i t for the purpose of securing 
the welfare and t h e economic and 
civil p·;ogress of the nation . . . However , 
although a State , i n the exercise of 
it s right of sovereignty, may subject 
pub l ic rivers to whatever regime 
it deems best , i t cannot disregard 
the international duty , derived from 
that principle , not to impede or to 
destroy , as a result of this regime , 
the opportunity of the other States 
t o avail t hemselves of the flow of water 
f or t he i r own national needs . 
Th e fundamental po i nt that is addressed here is 
that whi le States have a sovereign right to undertake 
activities within their territories they must also respect 
other States ' rights . Phat i s h ere advanced is a State ' s 
right t o be protected from injurious consequences of 
anoth er State ' s use . However , t h e I t al i an Court expressed 
this r i ght more as a po i nt of consideration that the 
act ing State had to bear in. mind when undertaking the 
acti vity. 
The equality of r i ght principle i s furt h er examined 
un der the h eading of I nternational Agreement and the 
pos ition s of States . The Spec i al Rapporteur traced 
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the early expression of this principle in the form of 
dividing the quantity of water to its present - day ' management ' 
• 9 6 formulation . 
Apart from the division by volume approach, States 
concluded treaties that restricted the use or flow of 
water . Thus, the Special Rapporteur states that long 
lists h ave been compiled of agreements embodying both 
aspects . He then goes on to give examples where '' express 
recognition of the principles of equality of right and 
of equitable utilization " 97 come up in agreements . 
Th e concept of equitable utilization is not a new 
one . The treaty signed at Bayonne between Spain and 
France in 1866 gives recognition to the concept of equit-
able and reasonable use . 98 
From the Austria/Bavaria dispute, 99 the countries came 
to an agreement which recognized that division by volume , 
and each State exploiting its volume , was not enough . 
Other factors would be of relevance when considering 
the particular use . Thus , the agreement envisaged the 
concluding of separate agreements for the particular uses . 
What is discernable from this agreement is a move towards 
the concept that various factors are to.be taken into 
account when considering the use of waters . Thus , economic 
interests and rights of private individuals were considered 
relevant factors . It is also clear that b~ allowing a 
volume of water belonging to one State to be used by another , 
and by weighing the relevant factors , the concept of optimum 
use of waters while having regard to factors affecting 
another ' s rights was evolving . 
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Another step towards the concept of equitable parti -
cipation was being formulated: that of equitable apportion-
ment . Under this concept although the waters were divided 
among States,this division did not apply when the parties 
consented to a particular use . Thus , by obtaining consent 100 
or arriving at particular agreements concerning the use 
of the waters , system States did away with the volume divisions 
of their waters . The Special Rapporteur uses the term 
equitable apportionment interchangeably with equitable 
utilization . 
There is an observation to be made concerning the 
quote in pa:r:o,.graph 59 . The Special Rapporteur quotes 
from authors who conducted an extensive study some twenty 
years ago on State practice. 
fin ding : 1 0 1 
They made the following 
While practice indicates that a State may unilaterally 
d evelop a section of an international river that 
is within its territory, it seems safe to conclude 
that the nature and extent of such unilateral 
development is limited by the equitable doctrine 
that one [ may ] not use his property in a manner 
to interfere inequitably with the use by another 
of hi s property . This conclusion is supported 
by both the domestic jurisprudence of a 
l arge number of States and international 
agreements. Frequently , when a State contemplates 
a use which is expected to cause serious 
and lasting injury to the interesti of another 
State in the river , development has not been 
undertaken until there has been agreement 
b etween the States . Such agreements do 
not follow any particular pattern but resolve 
i mmediate problems on an equitable basis . 
This quote embodies the previous points ·raised . 
However , it is t hought provoking for a special reason. 
Whereas the material used shows a progressive movement 
towards the concept of equitable participation , the finding 
appears to take a retrogressive step to the very first 
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reason of why the concept of equitable participation arose 
at all - proposed use entailing loss or injury of a substantial 
nature to t he use of other system States . 
Th us , it is submitted while one is considering the 
evo l ution of the concept of equitable participat i on one 
should bear i n mind this basic formulation . At the end 
one must ask the question but what really i s the underlying 
principle of equitable partic i pat i on , when does equitable 
participation come into existence? 
Th e Spec i al Rapporteur then approached agreements 
of recent vin tage . He noted that the concepts of equal 
division , eq~itable apportionment or utilization were 
incl uded i n ~hese agreements . However , also included 
was a more comprehensive approach to the multiple uses 
of waters . Th is last approach was noted even in non -
system wide agreements and those that were not oriented 
towards j oint management . 1 02 
He ma de two observations worth quoting : 1 03 
Ma ny modern treaties apparently take the principle 
o f s hared rights or common use as a presumed 
po i nt of departure and proceed , without 
art i culating any general rule , to 
s pell out the specifics of their sharing 
of r esponsibilities , of the arrangements 
f or var i ous kinds of improvement arid maintenance 
~arks , of co - ordination of activities ( including 
information and data collection and exchange ) 
and sett l ement of differences, usually · 
through the creation of a joint commission 
or simi lar inst i tution ; the notion of 
e qual division of water by volume is now 
ordinarily absent . 
There a l so exists a series of quite recent agreements 
among developing countries iD which the system 
States have felt it not only unnecessary to 
i terate t heir respective rights or shares , 
but have instead taken thorougr~oing steps 
t o br in g abo ut integrated management of 
t h e i r i nternational watercourse systems . 104 
62 
There are several observations that may be drawn. 
First the concept that all system States have rights in 
a shared international watercourse appears to have become 
an established principle . Secondly the concept of equal 
division by volume of water appears obsolete . Instead 
what is of importance is the watercourse system viewed 
as a whole and not piecemeal . There is no longer the 
need to expressly reco gn ize the rights of system States 
nor carry out a division of the waters as a sign of recog-
nition of these rights . What is now important is the 
integrated management of the international watercourse 
system which will seek to make optimum utilization of v 
the waters w~ile being fully conscious of the rights of 
all system States . Thus , it is submitted that equitable 
utilization has given way to optimum utilization . Support 
for this submission is found in the Special Rapporteur ' s 
fin ding : 1 0 5 
Similarly comprehensive approachesj designed to 
ach i eve not just ' equitable ' but optimum utilization 
by fully international , system- wide organizations 
have been taken by some or all of the 
system States of several other international 
watercourses . 
The point then is modern State pra~tice,as evidenced 
in agreements , approaches international watercourse systems 
as an integrated whole bearing in mind the rights of all 
system States and seeks to make optimum utilization of 
the waters . 
Where does the concept of equitable utilization come 
in? 
Under sub-heading 3 which reviewed the current state 
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of doctrine, the Special Rapporteur stated : 106 
Basing themselves on the practice of States, ... , 
virtually all the commentators writing 
in the field sustain the existence of 
equitable utilization as a rule of general 
international law where the system States 
h ave conflicting uses or plans for the 
further development of their shared water resources . 
I t is submitted that , therefore , the underlying principle 
that brings i nto existence the whole concept of equitable 
utilization or participation as it is being developed intois 
a conflict of uses . How does this conflict manifest 
itself? One need only go through the material referred 
to by the Special Rapporteur under this subheading . 
It manifests .. i tself when some form of " appreciable inj ury" 1 0 7 
is threatened or caused or when " substantial damage " 108 
would be caused , or when the use may " affect adverscly" 1 09 
the right of States . All this serves to manifest one 
fundamental point : that without some form of prosp e ctive 
or actual injurious consequence, the whole 
concept of equitable utilization does not arise . 
Th e Special Rapporteur produces material that supports 
the co - operation among system States for an integrated 
approach to the use , development , management of the inter-
national watercourse system . He demonitrates how the 
equitable utilization principle has been embraced in the 
integrated approac h. It is submitted that this is an 
obviou s fact , if in seeking optimum utilization and the 
approach used is that a watercourse system should be looked 
at as an integrated whole . In such situations there might 
arise conflicting uses and sol·ution must be worked out . 
However , t h e point is that one has arrived full circ l e . 
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It is submitted that the fundamental philosophy underlying 
the concept of equitable utilizational or the progressive 
concept of equitable participation is that while system 
States may be entitled to take unilateral action within 
their territory or control , the moment there is a 
threat of some injurious consequence of not an insubstantial 
nature to the rights of another system State, _ there is 
a duty to reconcile the conflicting rights . It is 
submitted that on an observation of the material , th~ 
concept is more concerned with prevention of the loss 
or injury thus imposing the duty to consider the con -
flicting rights before any use has been undertaken. 
However , it is interesting to note that by obtaining 
consent but providing full compensation , 110 arriving at 
an agreement , 111 having an international court or arbitral 
commission decide , 11 2 by reconciling the respective interests 
to the greatest possible extent 11 3 or by simply providing 
for damage a proposed use that might cause injurious 
consequences may still be carried out . 
What qualifies as an injurious consequence? If 
one tur•ns to Lake Lanoux , one might conclude that 
so long as even an ' interest ' might be ~ffected this would 
bring into play the whole regime . However , it must be 
noted that when negotiations began in Lake Lanoux Spain ' s 
rights as opposed to interests were being affected . 
It was only through attempts to reconcile the conflicting 
rights that France changed its pl~ns . This resulted in 
Spain 's in terests being affected . It is submitted 
that interests per se cannot stop a system State from 
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undertaking an activity . However, this does not preclude 
the fact that system States may have to pay compensation 
or seek some method for satisfying the affected interest . 
What then would qualify as l oss or injury or harm 
under this principle? Although this question will be 
considered under the chapter of ' apprec i ab le harm ' it is 
submitted , as it h as been noted above , that inj ury must 
be "appreciable ", something more than a minor detriment 
that may be fully compensated for and adequate security 
measures taken , 114 it must be ' substantial ' . 11 5 
What does the proposed article set out to do? 
It sets out~not only to articulate the settled principle 
of equitable.util ization but also the progressive concept 
of ' equitable participation ' 
went on to explain : 117 
1 1 6 The Special Rapporteur 
States sharing an international watercourse system 
not only may stand on their rights to reasonable 
and equ i table sharing of the uses of the 
waters but , arguably , also have a right 
to the co - operation of their co-system 
States in , for example , flood control 
measures , pollution abatement programmes , 
drought mitigation planning , erosion control , 
dis ease vector control , river regulation 
(training) , the safeguard ing of hydraulic 
works or environmental protection - or some 
combinat ion of these - as appropriate for 
the particular' time and circumstances . The 
detail s of such joint co- operative efforts 
on the part of system States should be. 
r eflected in one or more system agreements . 
Noneth eless , it may be maintained that there 
now exists a duty under ge~eral international 
law to participate affiroatively to effectuate 
more ratlonal developme,1t , use and Drotection 
of shared water resources . To the extent 
th at State Dractice does not establish 
that duty, rt lS be lieved that the progressive 
development of international law should 
est a b 1 is h it . :: 
In conclusion, several submissions may be made . 
'~my emphasis 
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First there is a definite coincidence of the underlying 
themes of the two topics . Equitable participation 
grew from the concept that States should not undertake 
activities within their territory or control if injurious 
consequences were to be suffered by another system State . 
Thus, recognition was given to the fact that system States 
had vis - a-vis each other equal status . Therefore conflicting 
interests had to be reconciled. A balancing of interests 
type test was inherent in reconciling the various interests . 
Importance , to the fact that it was the injurious consequences 
that brought system States to work out their rights , 
cannot be underplayed . Also injurious consequences 
had to be of an ' appreciable ' , ' substantial ', ' serious 
and lasting ' level; anything less would not give system 
States a right to oppose the proposed activity . However , 
if any ' interest ' as opposed to right was affected, this 
did not preclude the system State from carrying out the 
activity . However, adequate cofilpensation or measures 
taken to protect the affected State ' s interest had to 
be taken . 
The fact 1s that although there did not exist a 
principle in international law that prohibited system 
States from undertaking activities that cou~d cause 
injurious consequences to other system States , the many 
treaties and agreements the Special Rapporte~r used has 
demonstrated that system States have recognized vis-a--vis 
each other certain obligations . . Thus , although the various 
agreements are expressed -in prohibitory terms , the point 
is there did not exist a prohibitory principle per se 
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that forbade system States from carrying out whatever 
activity they wished to . What then can safely be con-
cluded is that system States because of the very nature 
of the matter concerned ( non-navigable watercourses) 
recognized irrespective of the fact that the activity 
was not prohibited that they still had obligations vis - a - vis 
other system States . The fact is that State practice 
and the numerous treaties and agreements all began to 
demonstrate and to accept that there are obligations entailed 
even when an act is not prohibited if the consequences 
are injurious to other system States . In the case of 
watercourse~~ this could readily be seen . One was dealing 
with " tangible " subject matter and thus effects of proposed 
activities could be worked out in " tangible" terms. 
By arriving at the formulation of equitable parti-
cipation other obligations that system States are seen to 
have vis - a - vis each other are also imposed . To what 
extent these obligations are regarded as duties can be 
seen on an examination of article 6 . 
Although terms such as optimum utilization might be 
used , it still embodies the fundamental concept of recon -
ciling the various rights : of a State ' s freedom to carry 
out an activity against the rights and interests of other 
system States . 
What the Special Rapporteur has done is, to codify 
into a prohibitory rule thit which has been established 
through practice . 
By so doing system States are prohibited from taking 
any unilateral action within their territories, if trans -
boundary consequences will be felt by other system States . 
,/ 
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From the material these transboundary consequences have 
to be of a certain degree such as to cause , for example , 
a ppreciable or substantial harm . 
It is now proposed to study the draft article on 
equitable participation . 
Part B. Section I - Equitable participation 
Article 6 
It is submitted that the underJying philosophy of 
this article is the concept of maximizing use of a shared 
resource . What is maximizing use? It is the concept 
of trying to--·achieve the maximum beneficial use of the 
resource for . all system States . Thus , the proposed 
use has to be evaluated from the standpoint of all system 
States concerned - without their consent the use cannot 
be undertaken . The underlying philosophy is really 
then equitable u s er of a shared resource . 
The underlying philosophy which Mr . Quentin- Baxter ' s 
topic i s built on is well expressed by Section 5 ( 1 ) of 
his Outline . Section 5 ( 1 ) establishes that States are 
ensured 
as much freedom of cho ice in relation to activities 
within their territory or control as is compatible 
with adequate protection for the interests 
o f affected States . 
This guiding principle does not consider the . aspect of 
maximizing the proposed use· for the benefit of all as 
a duty and a prerequisite ( as established by the watercourses 
topic ), before an activity may_ be undertaken . 
In t h e case of maximizing use , the focus is on the 
integrated approach of how the use may .be made beneficial 
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to the whole system . To use an analogy from Land Law , 
what one is concerned with is the concept of j_oint ownership 
of the resource . Viewed from this angle, it is then natural 
to understand why a system S~ate cannot undertake a 
use without consent of the other owners. Sovereignty 
of choice to carry out an activity within one ' s own territory 
is not paramount . It is making the most of the resource 
that lS . 
Thus , there is a tremendous difference in strategy 
in what the fundamental principles of _the two topics are 
based on . In Mr . Quentin- Baxter ' s topic there is no 
modificatiori.-of the rule of State sovereignty . The right 
of a State to ac·t is preserved even though it may be account-
able t o another State . However , in the international 
watercourses topic there has been a modification of the 
rule of State sovereignty . Through the concept of a 
shared resource , no system State may use the resource 
without consent of other system States . Thus , by using 
the concept of a ' shared ' resource , the frontier or the 
boundary , within which a State has sovereignty , is moved . 
~1at replaces it is the concept of joint ownership of 
a resource . 
Maximizing use then triggers the application of the 
artic l e . 
Does maximizing use have a significance in relation 
to Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s topic? It certainly does . 
However , here , maximizing use comes as a consequence in 
the situation where there is a possibility of harm and 
a regime is needed . Maximizing use will then become a 
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factor to be taken into account . Lake Lanoux may be used 
as an example to illustrate this submission . In Lake Lanoux 
it could be said that what the French did was to maximize 
use . How was this done? rhrough negotiations that 
were of a global character , the French scheme caused 
gain to both sides . The scheme took into account Spanish 
interests to the extent that not only was there no displace -
ment of water but Spain derived a benefit - a regulated 
flow of water all year round , preventing flooding and lack 
of water during dry seasons . 
topic , this is maximizing use . 
In terms of Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s 
Howevef~ what about the proposals Spain wanted the 
French to realize so that particular agricultural needs 
were cared for? What Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s rules would 
say is that what Spain wanted was pure gain without expense . 
If Spain was to provide for the expense , this was a dif-
ferent matter , a different situation . 
Turning to the Tribunal ' s advice in Lake Lanoux it 
is submitted that there is direct support for the submission 
of Mr . Quentin- Baxter ' s topic ' s approach to the ccncept 
of maximizing use : 1 1 8 
France is entitled to exercise her rights ; 
i gnore Spanish interests . 
she cannot 
Spain is entitled to demand that her rights be respected 
and that her interests be taken into consideration . 
A s a matter of form , the upstream State has procedurally, 
a right of initiative, it is not obliged to associate 
the downstream State in the elaboration of its 
schemes . If , in the course of its discussions , 
the downstream State submits schemes to 
it , the upstream State must examine them, 
b ut it has the right to give preference to the 
solution contained in its own scheme provided 
that it takes into consideration in a reasonable 
manner the interests of the downstream State . 
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However , in terms of the watercourse topic maximizing 
use comes together with the ~oncept of a shared resource . 
As sovereign rights are varied , it becomes paramount to 
maximize use in the sense that the proposed activity must 
make maximum beneficial use of the resource . Thus, in 
the Lake Lanoux situation it would mean that France has 
a duty to give consideration to Spain ' s proposals for the 
scheme to serve its agricultural needs . 
Is there then any manner in which Mr . Quentin- Baxter ' s 
topic may be used in the concept of equitable participation? 
It is submitted that an attempt can be made. in interpreting 
the concept~of equitable participation from the standpoint 
of the topic - of international liability. 
Part B. Section II - Equitable participation viewed from 
the perspective of the topic of liability for injurious 
consequences of acts not prohibited by international law 
Article 6 
In Part A of the chapter the writer came to the con-
clusion that what was being established was a duty of 
equitable participation imposed on system States , breach 
of which would entail wrongfulness . 
was seen as composed of two aspects : 
Equitable participation 
( 1 ) equitable utiliza-
tion and ( 2 ) the obligation of system States to co - operate 
in the protection and control of the international watercourse 
system . In terms of underlying principles , it was clear 
that the concept of equitable utilization was based on the 
fact that States were responsible for transboundary harm 
caused . There was the concept of equality of rights that 
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was embodied : States had the right to carry on ac tivities 
within their territories but other system States had also 
the right to ensure that they did not suffer transboundary 
harm or injurious consequenc~s emanating from the system 
State ' s use . Harm , here, or injurious consequences was 
qualified as having ot be of a certain degree such as appreci -
able , substantial or serious . As to the duty to co - operate 
in protection and control, this is what the progressive 
concept of equitable participation wishes to promote. 
Again it is submitted the underlying principle is working 
togeth er to prevent transboundary harm that might be caused 
by nature ( floods , eros i on etc .) or by man ( pollution , river 
regulation ) . __ 
Arguably this latter aspect of harm caused by man could 
be included in the earlier concept of equitable utilization . 
Th erefore , if transboundary harm occurs because the 
duty of equitable part i cipation is breached , the acting 
State has acted wrongfully and is responsible . 
The question that follows is how are proposed activities 
conceptualized? Is every prospe ctive activity wrongful 
if t here is the prospect of harm being caused? The dif -
fic u lty one immedi atley runs into is what is harm . Who 
determines and how is a n activity determined as causing 
harm? Are system States not then being given the right 
of ' veto ' or the right to paralyse the activities of other 
system States? Again while it is admirable to promote 
the pos i tive duty of co - operation and the duty of protection 
and control of the waters of an international watercourse 
system , what happens in situations where for example system 
i I 
73 
States cannot meet this duty because they are at various 
levels of development, because shared expectations are 
different , because urgent needs in a State may require 
measures to be taken to deal with an immediate problem? 
Is a system State responsible if it cannot afford to con-
tribute towards the development of a programme or meet 
the required standards that other system States wish to 
maintain? In a situation such as Lake Lanoux for example, 
was France wrong in carrying out the project that had sub-
stantial benefits only for the French? Should it not have 
carried out the project in such a way that Spain ' s agricultural 
requirement~-could also be met irrespective of the fact 
that Spain while putting forward its plans was not simul-
taneously making moves to contribute to the costs? What 
if a proposed use may not be making optimum utilization 
of the watercourse system simply because 'the co-system 
State cannot afford to make a contribution towards the 
costs? 
making 
Is the proposing State acting wrongfully by not 
optimum use of the waters and thus causing harm 
to the other system State? Has the other system State ' s 
rights been harmfully affected so that it has a right of 
action against the proposing system State? 
These questions lead to a basic enquiry about the 
article . Accepting that it is framed in prohibitory terms: 
Cl ) Is all transboundary harm wrongful - is its wrongfulness 
always dependent upon the breach of a rule which leaves no 
margin for appreciation or which entailed no comparison 
between the value of the activity and the extent of its 
harmful transboundary consequences? or (2) Is the wrongfulness 
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of transboundary harm commonly dependent upon a balance 
of interests that would determine wrongfulness?119 
Article 6 states : 
1 . The waters of an international watercourse system 
shall be developed and used by system States on 
an equitable basis with a view to attaining optimum 
utilization of those waters, consistent with adequate 
protection and control of the components of the 
system . 
2 . Without its consent, a State may not be denied 
its equitable participation in the utilization 
of the waters of an international watercourse 
system of which it is a system State . 
3 . An equitable participation includes the right 
to use water resources of the system on an equitable 
basis and the duty to contribute on an equitable 
basis to the protection and control of the 
system~as particular conditions warrant or 
require . 
The Special Rapporteur ' s view of the emphasis of the 
article is 1 2 0 
... on the sharing reasonably and equitably of uses 
( para.l of the article ) , the regional, or community 
oriented goal of maximizing the resource is 
expressly stated . Moreover, the States ' ri£ht 
to use the waters, in the technical sense of 
the term, is qualified by protection and control 
of the system ... 
The Special Rapporteur appreciated the point that "measures 
of protection" and "measures of control" would ultimately 
require precise definition . However , 0e pointed out that 
the terms employed " ... do have precedents and are generally 
understood and widely employed by water sour.ces specialists" .1 2 1 
The Special Rapporteur ' s cornrnents on the second and 
third paragraphs will be considered . The Special Rapporteur 
seffithe paragraphs as establishing positive rights for 
system States . However , the perspective from which these 
rights will be examined in this paper is as they are set, 
in prohibitory terms . What one is here concerned with 
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is the question , lS all harm wrongful or lS there a point 
at which harm is not wrongful. 
In article 6 ( 1) there is first the concept of use 
and development on an equitable basis . This is qualified 
by the fact that optimum utilization should be aimed at 
and that adequate protection and control must be considered 
when use and development is proposed. Thus , the first 
factor to note is that while optimum utilization should 
be aimed at, it is only a factor to be taken into considera-
tion . Thus, if for some reason optimum utilization cannot 
be attained the proposing State is not in breach of a duty . 
In our list _of questions it might then be concluded in 
our example of Lake Lanoux Spa iris plans may not have been 
feasible , for although accommodation of them might have 
made optimum utilization of the waters , other factors pre -
vented attaining optimum utilization . 
Equitable development and use however have to be 
consistent with adequate protection and control . What 
is adequate in a given situation may vary . It is submitted, 
this would depend on the system . Further in article 6 ( 3 ), 
the protection and control of the system is regarded as 
a 9-.uty, the standards of which are fixed 11 as particular 
conditions warrant or require ". 
Thus it is submitted this appears to be a duty which 
is relative and subjective to the particular . conditions 
of the system . 
to be observed . 
said : 1 2 2 
However, there is a basic level that has 
Th e Special Rapporteur in this connection 
the system State ' s affirmative involvement is 






s i nce the welfare and other vital interests of the 
system State are so often intimately linked to the 
wise husbanding of the system ' s water resources and 
the careful avoidance of water ' s so - called ' harmful 
effects '. 
One 1s again taken back to the basic premise : the duty 
of the acting State to prevent in j urious consequences of 
a t ransboundary nature and the right of the other State 
to demand protection from harmful effects , due to lack 
· of adequate measures of protection or control . However , 
as i t was first observed , what is adequate in a given situ-
ation i s relative to that system . This submission is 
read i ly endor sed by the Special Rapporteur who states that 
t he f inal ph r ase " as particular conditions warrant or require " 
"has bee n used to qualify the expectation ( or , conversely , 
t h e duty ) i n relation to need and to justification" . 1 23 
Thus , adequate measures of protection and. control refer 
to a duty not a factor t o be taken i nto consideration such 
as ' optimum utilization ' . However , the duty is qualified 
i n t hat i t i s relative to the given system . Thus , inherent 
in f i xing a point at when a system State may be held in 
breach of the duty is the fact that a weighing up process 
must f i rst be conducted . However , the fact to note is 
t h at what i s being emphasized is that every system State 
has a d uty and correspondingly every system State has a 
righ t to demand that adequate protection and control for 
t ha t system i s undertaken . 
Ar ticle 6 ( 2 ), a ccording to the Special Rapporte ur ,1 2 4 
. .. s i mply restates the rule that a system State 
i s entitled to i ts equitable ' share ', yet broadened 
to embrace the full scope of a system State ' s 
involvement in matters affecting the internat i onal 
watercourse system - its ' equitable participation '. 
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However, the writer sees real problems with this paragraph . 
The article is drawn up in terms that if consent is 
not obtained and a system State is denied its equitable 
participation , the State that has carried out the use has 
acted wrongfully . Prior consent is thus required . \, 
However, how is the acting State to know if another system 
State ' s equitable participation in the utilization of the 
waters has been denied? Who decides this? Can a State 
unilaterally decide that another ' s equitable participation 
has not been denied? Is it up to the other ( affected) 
State to decide if its equitable participation is being 
denied? \'7h-a-t is consent? Is it mere notice , the providing 
of information that a particular activity is being under-
taken? Or is it something more , something akin to a 
prior agreement between system States before the activity 
is undertaken? At this point it is pertinent to recall 
our discourse of Lake Lanoux . It suffices to say that 
if consent is equated with prior consent in the sense of 
prior agreement, does this not open the floodgates of system 
States h aving the arbitary right of veto over the activities 
of oth er system States? But what is ' equitable participation ' ? 
Article 6(3 ) partly defines equitable participation . 
It includes both the right to use and the duty to contribute . 
This is thus explained by the Special Rapporteur who sees 
this article as an attempt at : 1 25 
... a straightforward delineation of the two ' aspects ' 
of the compound principle of equitable participation : 
th e right to use and the duty to contribute 
in an equitable manner . The equities are couched 
in the larger perspective· so widely sought : the 
integrated approach to the development, use and 
protection of shared international water resources . 
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However, while ' protection and control ' have been examined, 
there is the concept of ' equitable use' that has still to 
be defined, for equitable use together with protection and 
control makes up equitable participation . 
To determine equitable use, one has to turn to a con-
sideration of article 7. The first thing one notices about 
article 7 is that it sets down a list of factors that together 
or in various combinations determine what equitable use 
is in any given situation . Thus it is through a balancing 
of interests that one arrives at what equitable use is for 
a particular system . Before considering equitable use 
determihants , a tentative conclusion may be submitted: 
equitable participation is based on the concept of a balance 
of interests . Thus the point of wrongfulness, the point 
when the duty of equitable participation is breached and 
when wrongfulness occurs is not based on a rule which leaves 
no margin for appreciation of the activity . Does it then 
mean , that before fixing the point of wrongfulness,attention 
to use the words of Mr . Quentin-Baxter, will first be focused 
on the conditions subject to which the activity can be con-
tinued without entailing wrongfulness? 1 26 It is submitted 
that this is the very principle that is embodied in the 
article . Thus , Mr . Quentin-Baxter stated : 127 
the determination of wrongfulness entailing State 
responsibility, and the adjustment of the rights 
and interests of the parties purs uant to ... 
[ liability for acts not prohibited by international 
l aw ] are simply two sides of the same coin . 
Thus can one say that there exists this 'bonding ' between 
the two systems of obligation in these articles? It is, 
submitted that the answer is ' yes' . It is clear from the 
V 
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article that a certain level of obligation exists but this 
level is relative to the particular system, thus it is not 
an absolute standard . vfuat is more to determine whether 
the obligation is breached, there is a set of factors that 
must first be considered . The problem here is whether 
one is dealing with the concept of the freedom of States 
to act being limited by their obligation to respect the 
equal rights of other States or is one really more concerned 
with maximizing the use of the system? What if no ' adverse 
effect ' is suffered but it is determined that equitable 
participation is being denied because full potential of the 
system is nit being made? Can this in itself qualify 
as an adverse effect or something that adversely affects 
to an appreciable extent? The point here is whether one 
is really dealing with loss or 1nJury suffered? The 
Special Rapporteur , Mr . Quentin-Baxter , said that loss or 
1nJury could be material or non material . 1 28 Further, 
it was a pure question of fact . In his preliminary report 
he quoted the following from McDougal and Schlei: 129 
It is a continuous process of interaction, of continuous 
demand and response, in which the decision-makers 
of individual nation-States unilaterally put 
forward claims of the most diverse.and conflicting 
character ... and in which other decision-makers, 
external to the demanding nation-State and including 
both national and international officials, weigh 
and appraise these competing claims in terms 
of the interest of the world community and 
the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or 
reject them . · 
The point is: is one dealing with conflicting uses 
of a State interest being adversely affected, or is the 
concept of maximizing the resciurce simply divorced from 
the concept of injurious consequences or being adversely 
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affected to an appreciable extent? It is worth turning 
to article 7 before a conclusion is reached on this point . 
Article 7 states : 
1. The right of a system State to a particular use of 
the water resources of the international watercourse 
system depends , when questioned by another system 
State, upon objective evaluation of : 
a. that system State's 
(1) contribution of water to the system , in comparison 
with that of other system States, 
( 2 ) development and conservation of the water resources 
of the system , 
( 3 ) degree of interference, by such use, with uses or 
protection and control measures of other system States, 
(4) other uses of system water , in comparison with uses 
b y other system States , 
(5) socfal and economic need for the particuJar use, 
taking into account available alternative water 
supplies ( in terms of quantity and ~uality), 
alternative modes of transport or alt~rnative 
energy sources, and their cost and reliability, 
asp rtinent , 
(6) efficiency of use of wuter resources of the system, 
(7) pollution of system water resources generally and 
as a consequence of the particular use , if any , 
( 8 ) co-operation with other system States in projects 
or programmes to attain more optimum utilization 
and protection and control of the system, and 
( 9 ) stage of economic development ; 
b. the total adverse affect, if any, of such use on 
the economy and population of oth~r system States, 
including the economic value of and dependence 
upon existing uses of the waters of the 
system, and the impact upon the protection and 
c ontrol measures of the system States ; 
c. the efficiency of use by other system States ; 
d. availability to other system States of alternative 
sources of water supply , energy or means of transport , 
and their cost and reliability , as pertinent ; 
e. co-operation of other system States with the system 
State whose use if questioned in projects or programmes 
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to attain optimum utilization and protection and control 
of the system ; 
2 . The determination, in accordance with paragraph 1 
of this article, of the equitableness of a use as part 
of a system State ' s equitable participation shall be 
undertaken through good faith consultations among the 
system States concerned at the request of any system 
State . 
3 . Failure to reach agreement on such a requested deter -
mination within a reasonable time entitles any system 
State participating in the consultations to invoke 
the means provided in these articles for the pacific 
settlement of disputes . 
The point to note is that adverse effect is regarded as a 
factor in determining equitable use . It is not the underlying 
principle . However , maximizing use must embody an element 
of conflict -of interests , an element of transboundary con-
sequences , an element of a system State ' s rights being affected 
whether in a material or non material way . The point is 
if there is going to be no adverse effect to system States, 
there is no denial of equitable participation . Co - operation 
is needed to reconcile the various interests . Maximum 
utilization encompasses co - operation to _make the most of 
a resource . However , why system States have to do this is 
because embedded in the concept is that by not maximizing 
use an injurious consequence occurs , harm is caused , all 
system States ' interests are being affected to an appreciable 
extent . To this extent then , if the positive duty to 
maximize use has not been complied with, a wrong occurs 
because harm occurs . However, to prevent this effect 
all consideration must be given to the proposed activity . 
To arrive at what maximization of ·use is , one uses the same 
methods to evaluate the proposed activity as that establ~shed 
by Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s topic . Both by a process of the 
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balancing of interests attempt in the end to achieve a 
result, the beneficial effects being such that even if an 
adverse effect occurs this is overridden by the beneficial 
effects. In the maximization of use , presumably if adverse 
effects are to occur they will be adjusted . It is clear 
that in the balanc i ng of interest in the maximization of use , 
the concept of wrongfulness is precluded . One is not 
concerned with the evaluating of the proposed activity 
from a point of view of wrongfulness . What one is 6oncerned 
with is regulating the use so that maximum benefit is sought 
from the activity . To this extent then one is at the very 
heart of Mr ; __ Quentin-Baxter ' s topic . Where the parting 
of ways occu~s is the fact that there is a duty of equitable 
participation and this duty embodies certain other duties 
breach of which would entail State responsibility for wrong-
fulness . To this extent then every system State is under 
a duty to observe the duty of equitable participation when 
considering a prospective use of the system . 
Th e other differentiating aspect lies in the subject 
matter one is dealing with . A watercourse system can 
be conceptualized as having no boundaries . It intimately 
connects one system State with another . · Transboundary 
effects are readily felt of any use made within a system 
State ' s terr i tory . As the resource is precious , it is 
important and imperative to forge co- operation and co-ordination 
of work done in a system . Maximizing use is a positive 
approach towards looking at the system in an integrated 
manner - having all the '-joint owners ' working together 
to get maximum beneficial use . 
83 
In Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s topic the emphasis is not on 
maximizing the use of a proposed activity . In the area 
of a prospective activity it is concerned with the prime 
obligation - that of preventing or repairing any prospective 
loss or 1nJury . States are viewed as sovereigns and their 
sovere i gn rights h eld important . Th ey are not conceptualized 
as j o i nt owners of a resource although interdependence and 
co - existence are recognized in this area . In the enc:1, it 
is obvious that the concept of maximizing use is indeed ahead 
of t h e rules that Mr . Quentin- Baxter is formulating - this 
1s becau se maximization of use establishes that irrespective 
of boundari~s , i rrespective of t h e sovereign right of choice 
to a c t within a territory , when an activity is proposed 
us i ng t h e watercourse system , i t has to be considered in 
the globa l sense of how t he whole system will be able to 








Th is chapter proposes to consider draft article 8 of 
the law on non - navigational uses of international watercourses . 
The art i cle is o n responsibility for appreciable harm . 
It i s , t h us , wi t h part i cular interest that it is studied . 
The c h apter is d i vided i nto two parts . Part A sets out 
primar i ly Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s study of the Trail SmelterI3o 
arbitration . Part B con s i ders the concept of appreciable 
harm . 
Part A 
Mr . Quent in- Bax t e r explained the underlying philosophy 
l 3 I on whic h h is concept of harm was based as follows : 
No t all transboundary harm is wrongful ; but subs antial 
transbou ndary harm i s never legally negligible . 
Conversely , i t is the policy of the law to allow 
eac h sovereign State as much freedom , in matters 
ari s i ng within its territory or jurisdiction , 
as i s compatible with the freedom of other States ; 
but n o a ctiv i ty which generates or 'threatens 
substantial t r ansboundary harm may be 
pursued in d i sregard of obligations that 
arise , i pso facto , in c u stomary international 
law . 
To r e iterate - Mr . Qu entin - Baxter ' s topic does not 
mod i f y the doctr ine o f State sovere i gnty ; it is prospective 
or ac tual ' harm ' tha t t riggers off the regimes his topic 
establi s h es i f St ates consider them necessary . Th ese 
reg imes h ave al ready been d ealt with by t h e paper . 
It is hi s d e v e l opment of t h e Tribunal ' s reason i n g 
i n the Trail Smelter
132 
aw a rds ~ involving Canada and t h e 
Un i t e d State s , that will n ow be considered . Th e f a c t s 
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of the case as expressed by the Special Rapporteur were :1 33 
Industrial pollution from the privately owned smelter 
[ in Canada ] affected woo ded and arable land across 
an international boundary, causing damage (that 
is, loss in value of crops anc: tree s) that h'as 
economically significant, though small in proportion 
to the value of the product of the smelter industry . 
The Special Rapporteur uses the case as a locus classicus 
for the formulation of certain rules . The first step 
the case took was to put into effect the general rule which 
in the watercourses context is readily accepted : the liberty 
of a sovereign State was limited by its obligation to respect 
the equal liberties of others . Mr . Quentin - Baxter derived 
from the Tribunal ' s decision in its second and last award 
the followin~-. First that : 1 3 4 
... if the transboundary harm which was still being 
caused by the Trail smelter was shown to be wrongful 
in character, Canada , as the territorial sovereign , 
would h ave an obligation to ensure that such 
harm did not occur in future . 
Secondly , the question whether the transboundary harm 
was wrongful in character would - subject to any special 
factors - depend on a balance of interest test ... 
Thirdly, the scientific tests carried out under the 
tribunal's direction had establishea that a regime 
which satisfied the balance of interest test , 
[wh en applied 1 would indeed provide reasonably adequate 
guarantees that harm would cease ; and the re was 
therefore no reason to include provision for compensation 
in the regime that Canada was under obligation 
to promote and sustain . 
Finally, if Canada were to fulfil its obligations 
in relation to that regime , and harm should nevertheless 
o cc ur, that would not in itself entail wrongfulness , 
but would attract an obligation to ensure 
that compensation was provided . 
The conclusions one arrives at from these findings 
are that a ' dual regime ' may be established and that irrespective 
of wrongfulness States may est~blish liability to compensate 
on the basis of h arm caused . What is this ' dual regime '~ I 
L I 
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It is a means of expressing the fact that both the concepts 
proposed by the topic and wrongfulness may co-exist . 
There will be a point of intersection between harm and wrong. 
However, to arrive at this point a balancing of interests 
test will be applied . Thus, applying the balancing of 
interests test,all harm may not be wrongful. However, 
at the determined point of intersection, harm might become 
wrongful . Wrongfulness of transboundary harm depends upon 
a balance of interests. 
The Trail Smelter dispute also proved the important point 
that : 1 3 5 
St~tes are not required, against their wishes , 
to suffe-r substantial harm if compensation is tendered . 
However , this statement cannot be left without comment . 
The Special Rapporteur, in considering both the Canadian 
and American arguments, saw that while harm had to be assessed 
within a particular context , one did not want to arrive at 
a situation where a State ' s freedom of action would be little 
less than paralysed . 136 
Bearing these concepts 1n mind, it is now proposed 
. to consider article 8 . 
Several observations of a general nature will be made 
on the nature of the concept of appreciable harm . 
Part B : Appreciable Harm 
It 1s of importance to note that article 8 and the 
princ i ples established by Mr . Quentin-Baxter are based on 
the same underlying philosophies . · Thus , the maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienan non laedas is used by both Special Rapporteurs 
as the basis of their rules. Again the abuse of rights 
8 7 
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principle and the principle of goodneighbourship (' voisinage '; 
which as Mr . Schwebel points out emphasizes the neighbour ' s 
duty to tolerate inconsequential or minor interference 
as opposed to the former doctrines that stress the restrictive 
a~pect of the property owner ' s use rights)137 play roles 
in establishing the foundation of the topics . 
In arr i ving at the concept of ' appreciable ' harm the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr . Schwebel, observed from material 
researched : 1 3 8 
Harm of some significance is required before the legal 
interests of the affected State would be infringed . 
The qualifying terms obviously vary, although it is 
not as:-;ceadily ascertainable whether the same or essentially 
the same degree of harm is intended to be imparted . 
1 Substantial ' , ' significant 1 ) ' sensible' ( in 
French ind Spanish) and 'appreciabl e ' (especially 
i n French ) are the adjectives most frequently 
employed to modify ' harm '. · 
He notes that the sic uterc tuo maxim has thus been 
almost always limited by the use of such terms . 1 3 9 The 
Special Rapporteur concluded :140 
In its use of ' appreciable ' , the Commission desires 
to convey as clearly as possible that the effect 
or harm must have at ].east an impact of some 
consequence, for example, for the public health , 
industry, agriculture or environment in the 
affected system State, but not necessarily 
a momentous or grave effect, in order 
to constitute transgression of an interest 
protected by international law . 
The aspect of harm being of a certain level is essential 
to the topic of Mr . Quentin - Baxter . Loss or injury is a 
pure question of fact here, and " its legal significance 
has to be estimated with regard to any available criteria that 
help to establish the shared expectations of the States con -
cerned . "1 4 1 It is remarked that in the first and second reports , 
the term ' substantial ' was used to qualify ' loss or injury ' 
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but has not been used in the Third Peport . 
Under the heading ' Making the rule more definite and 
certain ' the Special Rapporteur, Er . Schwebel, said :142 
the time has come to cast the sic utere principle, 
appropriately qualified, as a clear rule with 
respect to international watercourse systems . The 
classical case, ... , is the Canada - United States 
Trail Smelter arbitration. 
Lake Lanoux was also used to give support to this proposal .143 
The Special Rapporteur , Mr. Quentin-Baxter, was equally 
conscious of casting the sic utere into a working rule of 
law1 4 4 for his topic . 
The Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel, did not make any 
other comment of what the Trail Smelter case established . 
However , he ~ent on to survey natural and man-made hazard~ 45 
and concluded that States may be held responsible for harm 
caused in such situations . Thus , for example, he observed :146 
Dams in rare instances give way ; spills of highly 
toxic chemicals may amount to more than a ' pollution 
problem to be studied '. Damage may be catastrophic 
and involve, among other irreversible effects, 
the loss of thousands of lives . 
He also noted :147 
Thus a highly beneficial use or a combin[a]tion of 
uses downstream - . .. - may result in appreciable 
h arm to one or more upstream system States . 
Moreover, the refusal of a lower riparian, for example, 
to pay compensation, make contribution, or sh a re 
power ( as indicated or appropriate under the 
circumstances) may be adjudged to deprive an 
u pper riparian of its equitable participation . 
Thus , it is clear that the Special Rapporteur, Mr . Schwebel , 
has by not going into the question of wrongfulness recognized 
that appreciable harm may occur from a beneficial use and 
that there was an obligation to pay compensation or make 
appropriate reparation. If a State refused to do so it 
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could be held as liable for depriving another State of 
its equitable participation . 
Finally , it is submitted that the following represents 
the underlying philosophy of the concept appreciable harm : 148 
Just as important as the text of ' appreciable ' is 
the construction of the just balance in the procedural 
aspects of determining, and then quashing the 
charge or imposing , or excusing, a finding of 
appreciable harm . * Every effort has been made 
to heed the clear insistence that no system State 
be entitled to brandish a ' veto ' over the head 
of a State proposing a modification of the regime 
of the international watercourse system, consistent 
with affording each possibly adversely affected 
State access to the facts and respectable 
opportunities to evaluate the situation 
and to propose or to consider adjustments 
to resolve the question, and even to 
h ave its_ findings challenged . 
*(A footnote states : 1 4 9 
Of course , there may be some damage without compensation 
b eing justified in some cases . ) 
I t is submitted that this is precisely what the 
Special Rapporteur , Mr . Quentin - Baxter , seeks to establish 
in his topic . 
The Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel, concluded his 
view on the proposed article by noting that : 1 50 
The duty to inform and to consult and then to work 
out a solution that obviates the expected appreciable 
h arm is now cardinal in the field of shared 
water resources . To proceed unmindful of 
t he sovereign interest of other system States 
often may constitute culpable behaviour, 
contrary to existing international law . 
F i nally , not so much ' right ' is given the system 
State claiming that it may be affected that 
it is permitted to convert its legitimate interest 
and that of the international commur1ity into 
h arassment of the proposing State . 
The above then are the salient features that the 
Special Rapporteur saw as· the factors that will go towards 
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composing the article on responsibility for appreciable 
harm . 
It is clear from the approach taken by the 
Special Rapporteur that his observations on the funda-
mental concepts that go towards the proposed article 
are in accordance with those principles elucidated 
by Mr. Quentin - Baxter . (Thus, one noted that : ' harm ' 
must be of a certain degree; that injurious consequences 
may occur from a highly beneficial activity; that 
irrespective of the activity loss or injury will have 
to be compensated for : that it is on a balance of 
interests tbat a State will be held liable for appreci-
able harm; that negotiations are of prime importance; 
that the fundamental principle of a State ' s freedom 
of choice to act within its territory is compatible 
with adequate protection for interests of affected 
States .) 
However, the concept of appreciable harm as clearly 
demonstrated by the article is based on·a rule of pro-
hibition . 
It is equally obvious that operating simultaneously 
is a balance of interest test that may preclude wrong-
fulness if all given factors are weighed . 
Articles3 ( 1 ) and 8 ( 2 ) establish the general 
prohibitory rule , breach of which entails wrpngfulness . 
1. The right of a system State to use the water 
resources of an international watercourse system 
is limited by the duty not to cause appreciable 
harm to the interests of another system 
State, except as may be ~llowable under 
a determination for.equitable participation 
for the international watercourse system 
involved. 
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2 . Each system State is under a duty to refrain 
from, and to restrain all persons under its 
j urisdiction or control from engaging in, any 
activity that may cause appreciable harm to 
the interests of another system State, except 
as may be allowable under paragraph 1 of this 
article . 
However , it is clear that not all harm is wrongful . 
Thus , as i t has been observed in the context of equitable 
partic i pation , it is t h rough a balancing of interests 
that one arrives at the conclusion that appreciable 
harm i s not wrongful . If one says this then it is 
clear t h at two systems of obligation exist . One estab-
lish es t hat causing appreciable harm is wrongful . 
The other establishes that if means of achieving certain 
aims of system States pay reasonable regard to the 
separate interests of other States , injurious consequences 
that are incidental to their activities do not in 
themselves entail State responsibility for a wrongful 
act . I n t h is case , some form of reparation will need 
to be worked out unless a system State consents to 
foregoing i ts equitable participation . 1 5 1 
Article 8 ( 3 ) establishes that the proposing system 
State has to gJ_ve prio r notice of a proposed use 
if the u se may cause appreciable harm to the interests 
of another State . Th e point to note is that the 
proposing State gives prior notice . It decides if 
apprec i ab l e h arm might be c~used to the other State ' s 
interest before it gives notice . Thus , the initial 
dec i s i on is left in the hands of the proposing State . 
Under the equitable participation (article 6 ( 2 )), 
t h e actin g or proposing State must seek consent of another 
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State to make sure the other State is not deprived 
of its equitable participation. However, the other 
State also has a right under article 7(1) to question 
the proposing system State apout its proposed use. 
Article 8 (3) st ates : 
Before a system State undertakes , authorizes 
or permits a project of programme that may 
cuase appreciable harm to the interests of 
another system State , as determined on the 
basi s of objective scientific data , notice 
acc ompanied by technical information and 
data shall be made available by the former 
State (the proposing State) to the system 
State that may be affected. The technical 
data and information provided must be 
sufficient to enable the other system 
State to determine accurately and 
to evaluate the potential for harm 
of the intended project or programme . 
Article 8 ( 4 ) sets down a period during which 
the affected system State is allowed to evaluate the 
potential for harm. It is noted that until the other 
State has evaluated the proposed use, the proposing 
State may not initiate the proposed use unless jt 
obtains the other system State ' s consent . 
The proposing State under paragraph 3 of this 
articl e shall allow the other system State , 
unl ess otherwise agreed, a period of not 
less than six months to study and evaluate 
the potential for harm of the project 
or programme and to communicate 
its determination to the proposing State . 
The proposing State shall co-operate with 
the other system State should additional 
data or information be deemed to 
be needed for a proper evaluation . During 
the said or agreed upon evaluation period , 
the project or programme may not be initiated 
without the consent of the other system State . 
Articl e 8 (5) is the most interesting paragraph 
of article 8. 
5. If the other system State under paragr~phs 3 
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and 4 of this article determines that the intended 
project or programme would, or is likely to, 
cause appreciable harm to its interests and 
such harm is deemed by the other sy s tem State 
not allowable under the proposing State's 
equitable participation, and makes timely 
communication thereof to the proposing State, 
the proposing State and the other system 
State are under a duty, promptly after 
communication of such determinations to 
the proposing State, to consult with the 
objective of verifying or adjusting the 
other system State ' s determinations, and 
of arriving at such modifications of the 
intended project or programme by negotiation 
as will eliminate any re~aining cause 
of appreciable harm not allowable under 
the proposing State ' s equitable participation, 
except that compensation acceptable to the 
other system State may be substituted for 
project or programme modification . 
Under this article the other system State, after its 
evaluation, finds that the proposed use has the potential 
of causing harm to its interests . However, this is not 
all the other system State has to allege . It also 
has to state that such harm is deemed to be not allow-
able under the proposing State ' s equitable participation. 
Thus, there are two links to the evaluation process . 
The first is on the technical data and information and 
such other data and information as may be reque sted 
under paragraphs 3 and 4 . The other is an evaluation 
from the aspect of equitable participation . Equitable 
participation,will encompass equitable use determinations . 
Thus , good faith consultations may be entered into at 
the request of either system State . Also equitable 
use determinations have to be done upon an objective evaluation152 
of the various factors . 
Once the other system State determines there is a 
potential for appveciable harm, the next step is for the 
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system States to enter into consultation . 
results may be achieved : 
Here , two 
(1 ) that modifications will take place so that there will 
be an elimination of th~ cause of appreciable harm 
not allowable under the proposing State ' s equitable 
participation ; or 
(2 ) compensation may be substituted for modification. 
As one is dealing with a proposed activity , it is possible 
to have an either/or situation - either the source of harm 
is removed or compensation paid . 
However, it is clear that harm of a level that is 
not appreciible may be allowable . Also allowable is 
harm of an appreciable level if it falls within the equit-
able participation of a State . 1 53 AppI'eciable harm is 
allowable if it is compensated for . Thus , one may conclude 
all harm is not wrong . Also the other State is given the 
choice of either negotiating towards modification of plans 
or , if it accepts, compensation . One may also conclude 
that the other State is not obliged to accept compensation 
in lieu of a modification of proposed use . 
Article 8 ( 6 ) deals with the situation of the other 
system State failing to communicate to the proposing State 
its determination of the proposed use . So long as the 
proposing State has complied with paragraphs 3 and 4 , it 
may go ahead with its plans . The proposing State is not 
respons ible for any subsequent harm . Thus, this paragraph 
operates as a form of estoppel against the other State . 
Artic l e 8 ( 6 ) states : 
I f the other system State under paragraph 4 of this 
article fails to communicate to the proposing State 
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its determination that a project or programme would 
or is likely to, cause appreciable harm within the ' 
period pro~ided under paragraph 4 of this article, 
the proposing State may proceed to execute the 
project or programme in the form and to the specifications 
communicated to the other system State without 
responsibility for subsequent harm to the other 
system State from that project or programme, 
provided that the proposing State is 
in full compliance with paragraphs 3 and 4 
of this article . 
Article 8(7) considers the situation when a system 
State feels there is an urgent need to carry out the proposed 
use but that there is a probability of appreciable harm 
being caused . In this situation, again, the proposing 
State is obliged to go through the procedure set out in 
paragraphs ~f,- 4 and 5 . It must ' formally declare and 
dernonstrate 1 · that the proposed use is of utmost urgency . 
If it has complied with the articles 3 , 4 , 5 then it may 
carry out the project . However, this again is qualified 
by the fact that the proposing State must demonstrate 
... willingness and financial capability to 
compensate the other system State in full measure, 
by way of guaranty or otherwise , for all appreciable 
h arm caused . 
The paragraph does not relieve the proposing State of its 
duty to consult and negotiate in this case . The point, 
though , is would this paragraph allow a-proposing State 
to carry out a proposed use while consultations are going 
on? It presumably does . Here , the factor of utmost urgency 
takes precedence over appreciable harm . Again , harm here 
is not wrongful . Thus on "the grounds of utmost urgency 
for a proposed use , appreciable h~rm caused to another system 
State is not wrongful . _In this case it is only a regime 
of reparation that the other State must look to if harm 
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is suffered . 
Article 8 ( 7 ) states : 
I n the event that the other system State under paragraphs 
3 , 4 and 5 of this article communicates its determination 
t hat the intended project or programme would , or 
i s likely to , cause appreciable harm to its interests 
a nd the proposing State formally declares and 
demonstrates to the other system State that the 
project or programme in question is of the utmost 
u rgency , the proposing State may proceed without 
further delay with the project or programme , 
prov i ded that the proposing State is in full 
compl i ance with paragraphs 3 , 4 and 5 , of this 
article and provided that the proposing State 
demonstrates willingness and financial capability 
t o compensate the other system State in full 
meas ure , by way of guaranty or otherwise , for 
a l l appreciable harm caused thereby . In such 
e v e n t , t h e proposing State shall be liable for 
al l appreciable harm caused by the project or 
programme to the ot her system State . No provision 
o f t h is··paragraph shall relieve the proposing State 
fr om i ts duty to consult and to negotiate in 
a c c ordance with paragraph 5 of t h is article . 
In th e case of i r reconcilable differences , resort 
shou ld be made to the ' most expeditious procedures of 
pac ifi c s ettlement ava i lable ' and binding t h e parties . 
8. I r r econcilable differences between the proposing 
State and the other system State , with respect 
t o the adequacy of compliance with this article 
or concerning the evaluation of the potential 
f o r h arm of t h e intended project or programme 
or r egarding mod i fications of the project 
or p rogramme in question or with respect 
t o e ither system States equitable participation , 
sha ll b e resolved by the most expeditious pro -
c edures of pacific settlement available to and 
bind i ng upon the parties , or in accordance with 
the di spute settlement provisions of these articles . 
Finally art i cle 8 ( 9 ) states : 
If a proposing State fails to comply with the provisions 
o f thi s art i cle , it shall incur liability for the 
h a rm caused to the interests of the other system 
States as a r es ult of t h e project or programme i n 
qu est i on. 
Th e po int h ere i s that a+l harm , i rrespective of 
whether i t i s appreciable , has to be pai d for when system 
Sta tes do not observe t h e provisions of t h e article . 
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It is submitted that this paragraph raises several 
problems . The first is : how does one decide if there 
has been failure to comply with the provisions of the 
article? From the third paragraph, it was established 
that the proposing State evaluates ~~ether appreciable 
harm would be caused by the proposed activity . Thus, 
if on its objective evaluation it holds that no appreciable 
harm will be caused , it need not submit its plans to the 
other State . However , what if harm does occur? Does 
the proposing State have to pay? On the authority of this 
paragraph , it does. Is this not similar to one of the 
findings in ~the Trail Smelter case? That irrespective 
of no wrong being committed , by virtue of harm done, com-
pensation must be paid . 
What if the other State maintains that it suffers 
appreciable harm? Again under the paragraph the proposing 
State will have to pay . However , is not compensation 
the cheaper way out of a situation? Would this not in 
turn provide the proposing State with a licence to undertake 
any activity it feels will not cause appreciable harm? 
The problem of a proposing State evaluating the proposed 
activity in relation to the effect it will have on another 
State runs contrary to Lake Lanoux . The Tribunal stated 
that i t was up to the affected State to decide if its rights 
were prejudiced . Thus , if the affected State holds that 
its rights are prejudiced under the paragraph , the proposing 
State has to pay . 
The fact is that this paragraph is akin to an all -
embracing strict liability type provision . Every time 
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harm occurs the proposing State has to pay. On one 
end of the scale this might encourage States to carry 
out activities without taking due consideration of the 
rights of other States . Compensation will always be 
paid for damage done. On the other end of the scale 
every time the other State alleges harm, the proposing 
State has to pay. It is wrongful not to pay . However, 
. it is not wrongful to carry out the activity . 
The overriding emphasis is on harm caused. Reparation 
has to be provided whenever harm is caused . This is 
not akin to Mr. Quentin-Baxter ' s treatment of harm. 
To arrive at·-whether reparation has to be paid under 
his regime, one has to, by a balance of interest test , 
decide whether the acting State is liable. Thus, under 
Mr . Quentin- Baxter's regime, on a balance of interests, 
an acting State may not be liable to pay reparation for 
harm done . 
How does a State get over the fact that it has to 
pay for harm caused if it does not observe the article? 
It would have to give notice to the other Sta·te every 
time a use is to be made where harm might occur . However, 
there is no provision in the articles that says this. 
The only problem then would be where does one draw the 
line at what harm should be tolerated as an incidence 
of the goodneighbourliness principle and what should 
be paid for . 
It is submitted that article 8 as it now stands 
does not adequately deal with the concept of appreciable. 
harm . It does not do justice either to all the issues 
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the Special Rapporteur raised in his consideration of 
the material, leading to the article . 
It i s submitted that the incorporation of 
Mr. Quentin - Baxter ' s principles will provide for a 
complete appraisal of the concept and will realize 
Mr . Schwebel ' s vision of the article . 
Thus , a preliminary stage should be incorporated 
in the determination of appreciable harm. The method 
of approaching the proposed activity should be as outlined 
by Mr . Quentin-Baxter . Thus , if there is the prospect 
of harm the acting State should notify the affected 
State . Either State may initiate negotiations . 
The activity -will be evaluated and agreement as to 
whether a regime need be established decided . These 
negotiations will reveal whether there is a question 
of prospective harm . If prospective harm is likely , 
it will help determine the seriousness of such harm . 
If harm is determined to be of an appre~iable extent 
then the rules as established by the article should 
apply . These preliminary negotiations will also serve 
to regulate the consequences of harm that might not 
be of an appreciable extent . The result might well 
be a State modifying its plans to control the harm , 
the affected State agreeing to tolerate the harm or 
some form of compensation if at all necessary . Thus , 
the introduction of these rules will evaluate the proposed 
activi ty in an efficacious manner ; without curtailing 
the system State ' s soveriignty . Further , such a 
procedure may exempt the proposing State from paying 
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for harm caused if it is not appreciable . 
Secondly the article makes no reference to those 
activities already in existence that need to be regulated 
in case of prospective or ac~ual harm being caused by 
the existing activity . A separate article on appreciable 
harm should govern such situations . 
The passages quoted earlier in Part B demonstrated 
the Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel ' s concern over a 
beneficial use having harmful effects . He raised 
in his context the question of either appropriate measures 
being taken to prevent harm or providing for reparation . 
There was al~o his concern over a system State ' s sovereignty 
and the other State ' s interests . He observed the need 
to evaluate the activity by balancing the various interests . 
By applying to just future situations where appreciable 
harm might occur , the article is taking an unduly restricted 
approach . There are activities in existence to which 
probably no regulation exists as to what a State ' s liability 
would be if appreciable harm occurred . Mr . Quentin-Baxter ' s 
rules can readily cover sucl1 situations . 
Th us , an article should be formulated incorporating 
Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s rules; this article will cover the 
situation of actjvities already in existence . 
An ancillary point may be added. Instead of indirectly 
bringing in a balance of interests test , tl1rough the 
aspect of equitable participation , a general formulation 
of this test should be incorporated into the article, 
so t hat whi le technical data and information may help 
evaluate the potential of harm other factors , such as 
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those drawn up under article 7 will help evaluate the 
activity. Thus, the beneficial use of the activity, 
for example, to a system State will be considered when 
evaluating its injurious consequences. What is being 
promoted, here, is the 'global' evaluation of the activity. 
Thus, a highly beneficial activity which may cause appreci-
able harm to another State may be allowed, with adequate 
-measures of protection taken and reparation provided 
if harm occurs . 
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CONCLUSION 
Our preliminary enquiry in Chapter I discovered 
that for the purposes of non~navigation2l tises, an inter-
national watercourse system was relative in character . 
It was in certain situations that the watercourse was 
treated as an international watercourse system. Only 
-to those particular situations did the articles pro posed 
by the non-navigational uses of international watercourses 
report apply. Thus, the fundame ntal and preliminary 
enquiry was to isolate the circumstances to.which the 
proposed ari{cles were applicable. Three situations 
were discovered when a watercourse system was an intern2tional 
watercourse system, thus making the proposed articles 
applicable . These were : ( 1) when a proposed use by 
certain system States would affect adverseJy and to an 
appreciable extent another system State ' s use; (2) when 
a proposed use was to be made of the whole international 
watercourse system; and ( 3 ) when the watercourse was 
said to be a shared natural resource . 
Several problems were encountered wheD the writer 
tried to determine just when a system State would parti-
cipate in a system agreement affecting the whole inter-
national watercourse system . It was considered that 
article 4 ( 1 ) may be read as an expression of the policy 
that system States should take an integrated and co-ordinated 
approach to the use of the international watercourse system . 
The object of this approach was the maximum utilization, 
of the international watercourse system . Internationalizing 
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the system was a means of allowing this integrated and 
co-ordinated approach to be put into effect . However, 
as the writer's perspective was coloured by the concepts 
used by Mr . Quentin-Baxter, the enquiry was pursued to 
determine when all system States would participate in 
such agreements. It was proposed that the article basically 
gave in general terms an entitlement to participate to 
system States . It was then proposed that this entitle-
ment was used in the situations when some conflict 
of uses, some interest bei.lg adversely affected to an 
appreciable extent arose . This propos:ition \vas substantiated 
in the studj-·in Chapter I, Part B, on the duty to negotiate . 
The concept of a shared natural resource was 
noted to be of a relative character . It came into existence 
when use was affected . This led the writer to the enquiry 
of what affected meant . From the articles it was proposed 
that affected was qualified by adverse and quantified 
by appreciable extent . The proposition then forwarded 
was that a shared resource came into existence when use 
by a system State adversely affected to an appreciable 
extent another system State ' s use. The concept of a shared 
~esource at this stage of the enquiry was seen as not 
adding anything new to the articles. It wa~ question-
able whether there was a need for such a concept . In 
retrospect, it appears to support the princi~le of inte -
gration and co- ordination of use of a watercourse system . 
However , article 4 ( 1) sets this out . It is questioned 
whether in effect this articl~ on shared natural resource 
puts into practical terms the wider policy oriented 
104 
article 4 ( 1 ) , by limiting a system State ' s right to parti -
cipate in a system agreement only when its interests are 
affected . 
The duty to negotiate was considered of prime 
importance to the international watercourses topic . 
It was examined in Part B of Chapter I in this paper . 
Thus it was noted that in article 3 the duty only 
arose if necessary . This was taken as a clue to the 
question as to when the proposed articles were appl icable . 
The reasoning used here was that as system agreements 
where the object of the proposed articles and negotiations 
the means of: __ arri ving at this object it followed that in 
determining the underlying philosophy of negotiations 
one could dedu~ when the proposed articles were applicable . 
Thus , it was concluded that the underlying philosophy of 
the duty, was that it could not exist withbut at the very 
least a conflict of interests situation . This finding 
in turn was used to arrive at the conclusion of when system 
States would participate in system agreements involving 
the whole watercourse system . 
The all important object of the duty to negotiate 
1s the system agreement 1n the watercourses topic . It 
is the prime purpose of the articles . Through a comparative 
study using Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s concept of negotiations 
and ' agreements ' and Lake Lanoux, the duty to negotiate 
and system agreements were critically analysed . It was 
submitted that the ' system agreement ' was the equivalent 
of ' prior agreement ' in the Lake Lanoux context . This 
conclusion brought to the surface the problem of allowing 
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one State the right of ' veto ' of another ' s activities . 
The writer at this stage wishes to propose that better 
suited for the purposes of the topic would be the incor-
poration into the articles of the concepts in relation to thisarea 
put forward by Mr . Quentin-Baxter's topic . These concepts 
are critically examined in Part B of Chapter I . For our 
purposes, it suffices to say that States should be first 
encouraged to determine if a system agreement is necessary. 
It is necessary they should then decide when a system 
agreement should be concluded . 
An ancillary point that was made in the paper 
was the promqtion of the negotiations as a means of dispute 
avoidance as _ opposed to just being a means of dispute settle-
ment . 
In Chapter II the concept of equitable participation 
was studied . It is noted that the write~ came to a con-
clusion that the material used by the Special Rapporteur 
pointed to the conclusion that an underlying philosophy 
of the concept was based on the same underlying philosophy 
of the concept of appreciable harm. This ·underlying 
philosophy also was used by Special Rapporteur, Mr. Quentin-Baxter. 
Thus, the concept sometimes expressed by the Latin maxim 
sic utere tuo ... , the goodneighbourship ( voisinage) principle, 
the abuse of rights, or simply the fact that a State ' s freedom 
to act is limited by the obligation to respect the equal freedom 
of others , is an underlying philosophy for the concept of 
equitable participation , appreciable harm and Mr . Quentin - Baxter ' s 
top i c . However , in the equitable participation context , 
although this is proved to be an underlying philosophy, another 
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dimension is added to the concept - that of maximizing 
use . It is with some discomfit that the two concepts 
are made to fit together, and one is led to an almost 
impossible task of reconciling these two concepts - one 
triggered off by 'harm ' t h e other by ' equitable user 
of a s hared resource '. 
Thi s brings one to the conclusion that right from 
t h e beginning of the paper was seen emerging - the fact 
that t here are two competing doctrines that form the · 
under l y i ng philosophy of the articles on the topic of 
non-nav i gational uses of international watercourses . 
The root cau_~_e of why these philosophies are competing 
and incompatible is by v i rtue of the fact that they are 
promoting two fundamentally different concepts . With 
t he concepts of equitable participation, shared natural 
resource , system agreements , prior consent ( as in article 
6 ( 2 )), a l l system States being entitled to participate 
in system agreements affect i ng the whole watercourse system , 
there i s a definite move towards the modification of t h e 
ru l es of State sovere i gnty . Thus , what is being established 
i s the concept t hat the system States are ' joint-owners ' 
of a s h ared resource . Thus , this concept of joint -
owne r s h ip of a s hared resource , in fact , internationalizes 
the wa tercourse system and makes the articles applicable 
ever y time u se h as t o be made of the system .· The point 
is , in thi s particular cont~xt o f a watercourse system , 
t h e wors t fears of the Lake Lanoux Tribunal i n terms of 
g iving a Stat e a power of ' veto ' over another State ' s 
activit ies i s i nterpre t ed d i fferently . Th e rules, here 
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established would be read as representing a regime con-
structed for ' joint - owners' . 
However, there is the equally important concept of 
' appreciable harm ' that was analysed in Chapter III . 
The Special Rapporteur in advancing this concept was 
adamant that State sovereignty should be preserved . 
Thus , under the appreciable harm context, no State may 
have the power of ' veto ' over another State ' s activities . 
The Special Rapporteur , Mr . Schwebel, endorses fully the 
Tr i bunal ' s decision and emphatically stands up for the 
rights of all system States to have the freedom to carry 
out activities within their territorial jurisdiction 
conditional upon not causing appreciable harm to another 
system State ' s interests . 
It is important , first , for the Special Rapporteur 
of the non-navigational uses of watercourses topic to 
decide which doctrine he wishes to promote . What is 
suggested is that the importance of State sovereig11ty 
be retained and a regime built on the concept of equitable 
harm be established . To this end , the concepts used 
by Mr . Quentin-Baxter will prove invaluable . 
will be used is outlined in Chapter III . 
How they 
The concept of equitable participation should be 
reta i ned as a factor that helps determine whether appreci -
able harm would be caused . Thus, the equitable use 
determinants of article 7 will prove valuable in the 
balancing of interests when evaluating the activity . 
It i s suggested that the attaining of the concept 
of equitable participation should be aimed at . 
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Thus, a general article that embodies the concept 
of equitable participation should be promoted as a ' policy 
oriented ' ultimate goal in the area of international 
watercourse systems. However, for present purposes, 
it is more important to draft articles using a pragmatic 
approach towards establishing shared values for all system 
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